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PROMOTING INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION IN CONFLICTS INVOLVING DIRECT OR STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEEDS-BASED MODEL

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Intergroup conflict has been a dominant theme in social psychology since its emergence as an independent field of study during the first half of the 20th century. The dramatic social upheavals that have occurred since then, such as World War II, the Cold War, and the feminist and civil rights movements, have driven the theoretical and research concerns in this field. Primary among these have been attempts to identify the roots of intergroup conflicts and find ways to resolve them (Jones, 1998). For the most part, this research focused on the reduction of negative intergroup phenomena such as violent conflict, prejudice, and discrimination. In recent years, however, there has been a growing awareness—manifested in the present volume—that just as the prevention of illness is not equal to the promotion of good health, the reduction of “negative” phenomena in intergroup relations is not equal to the promotion of positive phenomena. Consistent with this understanding, this chapter presents a social psychological perspective on reconciliation, which requires “healing” impaired intergroup relations (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005) and thus goes beyond conflict settlement and conflict resolution, which focus on the cessation of conflict (see Kelman, 2008). The chapter addresses reconciliation processes between adversarial groups in

two different kinds of intergroup conflicts: those involving direct violence and those involving structural violence.

THE STUDY OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT IN CONTEXTS OF DIRECT AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: TWO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL TRADITIONS

In an influential distinction, Galtung differentiated between conflicts characterized by *direct violence* and those characterized by *structural violence* (1969). Conflicts of direct violence involve episodic, intentional, and explicit acts of aggression by members of rival groups. Death, destruction, and extreme humiliation typify such disputes, of which open war is a pinnacle example. In conflicts that involve structural violence, injury to the outgroup takes the form of prejudice, discrimination, and social disadvantage. Structural violence is committed via the manner in which social institutions are arranged, rather than by the deliberate actions of particular group members (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008). For example, development decisions that make residents of poor areas vulnerable to environmental hazards or workplace policies that penalize employees for time spent caring for their family members may exemplify structural violence because they cause disproportionate harm to minorities or women.

Although not explicitly stated, the distinction between direct and structural violence has steered two traditions in the social psychological study of intergroup conflict. The first research tradition, which has focused on overt violence, employs cases of extreme intergroup aggression to assess and refine the social psychological understanding of group conflict. These include contexts such as the Rwandan genocide (e.g., Staub, 2008), the Balkan wars (e.g., Čehajić, Brown, & Castano, 2008) and the conflict in the Middle East (e.g., Kelman, 1999). The second tradition, which has focused on structural violence, has been conceptualized and carried out mainly in North America, a world region characterized by entrenched structural violence but where direct intergroup violence is now relatively rare. This research tradition is embodied in copious social research on racism and sexism and ways to reduce them (Fiske, 1998).

Despite the distinction between these two research traditions in the forms of social harm they probe, both have recently undergone a similar shift in theoretical emphasis, reflected in the present volume. Rather than attending mainly to the *prevention* of aggression between groups (e.g., by reducing violence or prejudice), there is a growing interest in *promoting* positive forms of group contact and relations, such as forgiveness (e.g., Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) and allophilia—positive attitudes toward groups other than one's own

(e.g., Pittinsky, Rosenthal, & Montoya, this volume). The growing interest in reconciliation—a concept that has only recently entered the scientific discourse (Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008; Rouhana, 2004)—is part of this trend because, as mentioned, it relates to healing relations between former adversaries rather than merely hastening the cessation of violence. Thus, in addition to the absence of prejudice or discrimination, a reconciled social reality is characterized by positive intergroup phenomena such as mutual respect and an appreciation of the positive qualities of each group and its contribution to society as a whole.

In this chapter, we discuss the meaning of reconciliation and reasons for current interest in this concept. Although the notion of reconciliation has grown out of the research tradition that focuses on direct violence, it is also applicable to contexts of structural violence. Thus, for the sake of simplicity and parsimony, we use the term *reconciliation* in relation to both contexts. We then present the needs-based model of reconciliation, which has guided our own work in the area, and describe studies supporting this model in contexts of direct and structural violence. We conclude by discussing the implications of our approach and highlighting issues that remain to be addressed.

RECONCILIATION AND ITS INSTRUMENTAL AND SOCIOEMOTIONAL ROUTES

For several decades, scientific discourse on conflict and its resolution has been dominated by the so-called realist approach (Scheff, 1994), which views conflict essentially as the outcome of disputes between parties over scarce resources and conflict resolution as the achievement of an agreed formula for dividing such resources (e.g., Campbell, 1965). In contrast, the reconciliation approach views conflict resolution more holistically, as a process of dismantling the residual emotional barriers that remain from conflict (e.g., feelings of victimhood and guilt), so as to foster more harmonious relations (Nadler et al., 2008). If these barriers continue to exist, they will make agreement on the division of resources more difficult. Moreover, even if such an agreement had been reached, as long as these barriers had not been dismantled the conflict may flare up again.

The growing interest in reconciliation within social psychology can be traced to developments both outside and within the field. Within the larger societal context, there is a growing awareness of the need to address the emotional consequences of conflict. This awareness has found expression in the establishment of truth commissions in different postconflict regions, such as South Africa and Guatemala (Hughes, Scabas, & Thakur, 2007), and in public apologies by national and community leaders seeking to heal intergroup relations through expressing regret for the pain and suffering inflicted by their

group in the past (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009). Examples of these apologies are Pope John Paul's apology in 2000 to the Jewish people for the role of the Catholic Church in 2 millennia of anti-Semitic persecution and Tony Blair's 2006 expression of sorrow for the role of Britain in the slave trade during the 17th and 18th centuries.

Within our field, recent work has documented how the emotional consequences of intergroup aggression, such as trauma and humiliation, may inhibit the resolution of conflicts or ignite their reemergence after their seeming close (e.g., Lindner, 2006). This research is consistent with the observation that the emotional consequences of conflict continue to influence intergroup relations long after open violence has abated (e.g., Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). Moreover, the shift from a view of conflict resolution as synonymous with resource reallocation to an emphasis on the emotional consequences of conflict is compatible with the growing attention to emotional constructs in social psychological research and theory on intergroup relations (e.g., collective guilt, Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; collective victimhood, Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; intergroup forgiveness, González, Manzi, & Noor, this volume).

We suggest that the emotional barriers to reconciliation fall into two main clusters: One cluster relates to issues of intergroup trust, and the other relates to matters of the ingroup's identity. At the center of the first cluster are feelings and perceptions that concern the other party and one's relationship with it. The pivotal issue here is the degree to which one feels that the members of the other group wish the ingroup well and act accordingly. At the center of the second cluster are feelings and perceptions that relate to the adequacy and worth of the ingroup's identity. These may include feelings and perceptions of collective guilt on the one hand or the feelings of collective powerlessness that are associated with viewing the ingroup as the victim of an outgroup's aggression or oppression. This distinction between a focus on intergroup relations and the identities of each of the groups is in line with Kelman's suggestion that the end of intergroup conflict can be facilitated by changing the quality of intergroup *relations*, or by changing aspects of the *identities* of the involved parties (Kelman, 2008). In line with Kelman's theorizing, we have distinguished between two corollary types of reconciliation: *instrumental reconciliation*, which aims to effect positive change in intergroup relations by restoring trust and promoting benevolent feelings among adversaries; and *socioemotional reconciliation*, which aims to reduce the threats posed to the parties' identities (see also Rouhana, 2004). An example of socioemotional reconciliation is when identity threat associated with the perception that one's group is held responsible for wrongdoings is ameliorated by an expression of forgiveness from one's adversary.

The chapters in the present volume provide examples of these two different components of intergroup reconciliation, that is, the restoration of trust and

positive intergroup relations on one hand, and the restoration of groups' positive identities on the other hand. Chapters by Davies, Wright, and Aron; Page-Gould and Mendoza-Denton; and Swart, Turner, Hewstone, and Voci center on the effects of significant contact across group boundaries on the improvement intergroup relations and the enhancement of intergroup trust; the present chapter, as well as Chapters by Butz and Plant, Purdie-Vaughns and Walton, and González et al., focus on different threats posed to the identities of groups in a conflict and on socioemotional processes that ameliorate these threats and provide identity safety, such as intergroup forgiveness. It should be noted, however, that these two processes of reconciliation, instrumental and socioemotional, are not purely distinct, and the separation between them is made for sake of conceptual clarity. For example, past research noted that the effects of socioemotional processes such as apologies for past wrongdoings are dependent on the level of trust that one has in the adversary (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006), and Swart et al. in the present volume show that contact across group boundaries affects willingness to forgive the outgroup for past wrongdoings. Thus, instrumental and socioemotional reconciliation are distinct yet interdependent processes.

THE INSTRUMENTAL ROUTE TO RECONCILIATION: “MENDING” BROKEN RELATIONSHIPS BY RESTORING INTERGROUP TRUST

Scholars warn that trust is often the first casualty of conflict and that, as long as relations are strained by intense distrust, a conflict is not likely to end (Deutsch, 2008). When groups feel that they cannot trust their adversary, even positive gestures become imbued with negative meanings. An illustration of this is the finding by Nadler and Liviatan (2006) that Israelis who distrusted Palestinians had worse perceptions of Palestinians and were less willing to reconcile with them if they read an apology by a Palestinian leader than if they had not read the apology. In contrast, Israelis who were relatively trusting of Palestinians were more willing to reconcile after they read such an apology. Thus, not only is trust important to hastening the cessation of hostilities, but its absence may upend the intended consequences of well-meaning concessions.

How can trust between parties that are involved in conflicts of direct violence be restored? Research on intergroup relations shows that this trust can be achieved via a sequence of positive and reciprocal acts that convince adversaries that the other side no longer harbors malevolent intentions. The graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT) proposal developed by Osgood (1962) as a way to reduce Cold War–era distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which stresses the importance of reciprocal “confidence building measures” for trust building between

adversaries, represented such a process in international relations. It advocated an exchange of incrementally more meaningful acts of goodwill with the aim of increasing adversaries' mutual trust. The basic ingredient of this approach to intergroup reconciliation that is applicable to intergroup relations within societies is the steadily growing belief in the trustworthiness of the adversary, which emanates from repeated and reciprocal steps toward cooperation. These exchanges advance goals that are instrumental for both parties, such as public health, and exemplify *instrumental reconciliation* (Nadler, 2002).

The instrumental route to reconciliation is relevant in contexts of both direct and structural violence. In contexts of *direct intergroup violence*, many peace-building efforts that pave the transition from enmity to peace are based on this logic. For example, the architects of the 1993 Oslo agreement between Israelis and Palestinians reasoned that, after years of protracted conflict associated with many episodes of direct violence, the transition to peace must be ushered by an interim period of trust building. The plan was to precede negotiations on the thorny issues that divided the parties, such as land, by a 5-year period in which the parties would cooperate on shared problems having instrumental value, such as economic development, thereby gradually learning to trust each other (Maoz, Shikaki, & Rothstein, 2002).

In intergroup relations characterized by structural violence, the instrumental route to reconciliation is used to move beyond prejudice and discrimination to equality and cooperation. A dominant framework in this approach has been the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), which has produced voluminous research in the social sciences. This approach is consistent with our conception of instrumental reconciliation as the product of sustained, cooperative, and meaningful contact between members of opposing groups. When sociocultural shifts make prejudice and discrimination unconscionable to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, reducing its existence becomes a common instrumental goal, as both groups may be interested in smoothing their relations, preventing further societal unrest, and reaching a new, more equal, status quo.

Research on the contact hypothesis increasingly demonstrates that the benefits of contact are attributable to psychological processes that go beyond the "cold" dimension of goal-oriented cooperation. Indeed, warm feelings and cross-group friendship shepherd constructive changes in intergroup relations (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Moreover, increased trust was found to mediate the link between positive intergroup contact, such as occurs in affectively meaningful cross-group friendships, and reduced prejudice (Swart et al., this volume). Apparently, group members generalize the greater trust they feel toward the outgroup member with whom they have friendly relations to the outgroup in general, thus generating greater willingness to engage with the outgroup in a constructive manner (Tropp, 2008). It

is important to note, however, that in contexts of both direct and structural violence, instrumental reconciliation focuses on effecting current, pragmatic change in intergroup relations. It has a lesser focus on the emotional consequences of past suffering and humiliation for each of the parties' identities.

SOCIOEMOTIONAL RECONCILIATION: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE NEEDS-BASED MODEL ON REMOVING THREATS TO GROUPS' IDENTITIES

The second route to reconciliation consists of redressing these threats to adversaries' identities caused by the suffering of direct violence and the long-term oppression of structural violence. As we will explain, because this process involves changing the social identities of the involved parties by satisfying their emotional needs, we have labeled it *socioemotional reconciliation*. It describes how the removal of the threats posed to the identities of victimized–disadvantaged groups as well as perpetrating–advantaged groups restores their sense of worthy identity and promotes their willingness to reconcile with each other. The needs-based model accounts for this process and assumes that the nature of the injury to identity differs for victims and perpetrators (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) and for disadvantaged versus advantaged groups (Shnabel, Nadler, Dovidio, & Ullrich, 2010).

The Needs-Based Model in Contexts of Direct Violence

Acts of direct violence pose different types of identity threats for victims and aggressors. Victims, by definition, are harmed by acts over which they have little power or control. According to the needs-based model, victimizing experiences threaten group members' sense of themselves as human beings who have agency and equal worth. Although perpetrators have more power than victims, their identities are also imperiled by the perpetration of violence, in the form of threats to their image as morally worthy human beings. When wrongdoing is exposed, perpetrators risk accusations of guilt and exclusion from the moral community to which they belong (Tavuchis, 1991). Because the threats to the identities of victims and perpetrators are not symmetrical, they give rise to different needs in each group. For victims, identity threat brings about an enhanced need for power. For perpetrators, identity threat enhances their need to regain social acceptance from relevant others. Satisfying these needs restores the victims' sense of power and the perpetrators' moral image.

The restoration of their impaired dimensions of identity can be met unilaterally by the victim and the perpetrator, though not necessarily by

constructive means. Victims may restore their sense of power by taking revenge, while perpetrators may reduce threat to their moral image by using exonerating cognitions to legitimize their actions, by belittling the painful consequences of their actions, or by psychologically distancing themselves or even dehumanizing their victims (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). Obviously, these unilateral methods of restoring deficits in social power and moral image will likely fuel rather than quell intergroup conflict (Lindner, 2006).

More constructively, the restoration of impaired identity dimensions can also be achieved through reciprocal interactions. Specifically, the needs-based model considers socioemotional reconciliation to be a process of *social exchange* in which victims' need for empowerment is satisfied by the perpetrator and perpetrators' need for acceptance is satisfied by the victim. A primary illustration of this social exchange is the apology–forgiveness cycle, which, if successful, can alter the conflictual reality between two adversaries (Tavuchis, 1991). By apologizing and taking responsibility for past wrongdoing, perpetrators put their fate in the hands of victims, who have the power to grant or withhold forgiveness. This is an empowering experience for victims (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003). At the same time, granting forgiveness to the perpetrator removes the aforementioned threat to the perpetrator's moral image (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003). Thus, our model suggests that a process of reciprocal need satisfaction removes threats to victims' and perpetrators' identities and produces a greater willingness for reconciliation. We have labeled this approach the *needs-based model of reconciliation* because it bases socioemotional reconciliation on the satisfaction of victims' and perpetrators' needs (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). This process is described in Figure 10.1.

We examined the model's predictions in two intergroup contexts: relations between Israeli Jews and German nationals and between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. Although the two contexts differ on central dimensions (e.g., the history of one includes genocide, whereas the other constitutes an ongoing intergroup conflict within the Israeli society), they were both framed in the experiments as representing direct violence. In the study on Jewish–German relations, the element of direct violence was made salient by reminding participants of the Holocaust. In the study on relations between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews, the element of direct violence was made salient by reminding participants of the Kfar Kasem killings of 1956, in which the Israeli border patrol killed 43 unarmed Arab civilians who had broken a curfew restriction.

The significance of coevaluating these two contexts is that the same group (i.e., Israeli Jews) represents the victimized group in the first context and the perpetrating group in the second. This allowed us to assess the assertion that receiving messages expressing either acceptance or empowerment from the outgroup differentially affects victims' and perpetrators' willingness




Figure 10.1. The needs-based model of reconciliation. From "A Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation: Satisfying the Differential Emotional Needs of Victim and Perpetrator as a Key to Promoting Reconciliation," by N. Shnabel and A. Nadler, 2008, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 94, p. 118. Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association.

to reconcile in isolation from sociocultural variations between actual victim–perpetrator dyads. Thus, in the context of Jewish–German relations, Jews, as members of the victimized group, were expected to be readier to reconcile after receiving a message of empowerment from a German representative, whereas German participants, as members of the perpetrating group, were expected to be readier to reconcile following a message of acceptance from a Jewish representative. In the Arab–Jewish context, Israeli Jews, as members of the perpetrating group, were expected to be readier to reconcile following a message of acceptance from an Arab representative, whereas Arab participants would be readier to reconcile following a message of empowerment from a Jewish representative. Our findings supported these predictions (see Shnabel et al., 2009).

The Needs-Based Model in Contexts of Structural Violence

As a step toward integrating the research traditions of direct violence and structural violence, we examined the applicability of the needs-based model to the latter context as well. This examination sought to answer three questions: (a) whether members of disadvantaged groups suffer threats to their sense of

agency and power and whether members of advantaged groups suffer threats to their moral image; (b) whether these threats deepen needs for empowerment and acceptance, respectively; and (c) whether intergroup relations could be improved with a social exchange interaction in which the disadvantaged group's need for empowerment is satisfied by the advantaged group and the advantaged group's need for acceptance is satisfied by the disadvantaged group.

The first question touches on a fundamental distinction between conflicts of direct and structural violence. In conflicts of direct violence, the suffering inflicted on victims is salient, and thus threats to victims' and perpetrator's identities are almost constantly present. In contexts of structural violence, social identity theory tells us that as long as status relations are perceived as legitimate and stable (i.e., secure), no identity threat is likely to occur (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and members of both groups are likely to view social inequality as normative and justified (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). However, when status relations are perceived as illegitimate and unstable (i.e., insecure), members of disadvantaged groups will view equality as attainable and therefore experience their relative powerlessness as threatening to their ingroup identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Similarly, when the legitimacy of privilege is questioned, allegations of exploitation and injustice will embody potent threats to the moral identity of the advantaged group (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). This suggests an affirmative, but conditional, answer to the first question: Advantaged groups are likely to experience a threat to their moral image, and disadvantaged groups are likely to experience a threat to their sense of power, but only when status relations are insecure.

The second question is whether these threats to sense of power and moral image translate into increased needs for empowerment and acceptance by the disadvantaged and advantaged groups, respectively. Research suggests an affirmative answer. Members of disadvantaged groups typically approach encounters with the advantaged group with the goal of gaining power and changing the status quo toward intergroup equality. Members of advantaged groups are more cautious not to "upset the applecart" and seek social harmony and mutual acceptance between members of the two groups so as to alleviate their unease about their relative privilege (Dovidio, Saguy, & Shnabel, 2009). More directly, Shelton, Richeson, and Vorauer (2006) suggested that advantaged groups seek to be *liked* by disadvantaged groups, whereas disadvantaged groups seek *respect* from members of their outgroup. Although not entirely identical, these concepts correspond to acceptance and empowerment, suggesting that the logic underlying the needs-based model in explicitly violent conflicts is applicable to structurally violent conflicts.

This brings us to the third question: whether the reciprocal satisfaction of needs for empowerment and acceptance benefits intergroup relations. To answer this question, it should be noted that, because of their different nature,

the means to promote reconciliation in contexts of structural and direct violence are different. Because structural violence reflects the existence of an unequal and discriminatory social structure, ending it requires equality and social justice. In comparison, reducing direct violence requires lessening or eliminating the likelihood of future overt violent episodes. These two aspects of peacemaking have been labeled as *positive peacemaking* and *negative peacemaking*, respectively (Christie et al., 2008). The different meanings of reconciliation in either setting should be expressed in different behaviors. In conflicts involving direct violence, reconciliation should be expressed in willingness to mend ruptured relations and to foster greater intergroup closeness (e.g., participation in joint activities), which will lessen the possibility of future direct intergroup violence. In conflicts involving structural violence, reconciliation should be expressed in the advantaged group's commitment to achieving intergroup equality and its willingness to relinquish privileges that obstruct that goal.

We recently tested these hypotheses among participants who belonged to either a prestigious or less prestigious university (Shnabel et al., 2010). Participants were told that the selection committee of a prestigious university had repeatedly discriminated against students from a less prestigious university in selecting candidates for admission to a competitive program of study. Students from both universities had applied to the program, which exists only in the prestigious university. However, students from the less prestigious university were categorically excluded from consideration, regardless of their individual merit. Framing the scenario as one of repeated discrimination by the advantaged group against the less advantaged group in access to a resource that both groups desired but only the advantaged group had control over rendered the experimental setting as one of structural violence.

Once given this information, both groups received an accepting, empowering, or neutral message from the outgroup. Afterward, the orientation of both groups toward the other side was assessed, and members of the advantaged group rated their willingness to invest in efforts to end discrimination against students from the outgroup. The willingness of the disadvantaged group to work against discrimination was not measured because it reflects struggling for their own cause rather than for the benefit of the other group or the relations with it. In other words, it was not assumed to be indicative of a positive outgroup orientation.

As expected, members of the disadvantaged group who received an empowering message from the outgroup expressed a more positive orientation toward the outgroup's members (e.g., a more favorable attitude and a willingness for cooperative interaction) than did those who received the accepting or neutral message. This was particularly true when members of the disadvantaged group had perceived the discrimination to be intentional, possibly reflecting the more acute emotional consequences of a deliberate versus unintended

wrong. The finding that a message of acceptance did not have a similar positive effect on the social orientation of members of the disadvantaged group indicates that expressions of social acceptance, even if well-intentioned, are not enough to satisfy the needs of victimized groups. Disadvantaged group members desire social change and greater intergroup equality; therefore, they have a greater need for empowerment than for empathy (see Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). Moreover, expressions of empathy and social acceptance are sometimes used by advantaged groups as a rhetorical tool to avoid the real problem of changing an existing social structure of inequality (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008). Benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) serves as an example of such rhetoric.

The picture regarding members of the advantaged group was more complex. Consistent with the predictions of the needs-based model, a message of acceptance increased the positive orientation of advantaged group members toward the outgroup, which in turn led to greater willingness to work against discrimination. Apparently, a message of acceptance from the disadvantaged group alleviated the threat to advantaged group members' moral image, increasing their feelings of solidarity with the disadvantaged group while implying that, as members of a moral community, they should be sensitive to others' distress (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004). Thus, it encouraged their readiness to oppose discrimination, despite the cost to their relative social advantage.

The empowering message also improved the orientation of advantaged group members toward the outgroup, apparently because it satisfied their wish to maintain their superior status (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). However, this positive change in orientation failed to translate into an increased willingness to work to end intergroup discrimination. Instead, the empowering message, which reminded advantaged group members of their influence and ability, reinforced their perception that the status quo was legitimate and undermined their willingness to act for greater equality.

From a broader perspective, these findings tell us that, in the context of structural violence, the specific elements included in intergroup reciprocal messages are highly important, as even objectively positive messages may fail to promote reconciliation if they do not address the unique emotional needs of advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Specifically, messages that legitimize the advantaged group's position will bolster the view that structural violence is acceptable and justified. When this legitimization comes from the disadvantaged group itself—as was the case in the empowering message condition of our experiment—its capacity to sanction structural violence is particularly great because it absolves the advantaged group of the sense of guilt that would otherwise taint the benefit of an unearned advantage. Thus, such

messages provide the advantaged group with the rationale for doing nothing to change the system of structural violence from which it benefits. The finding that only an empowering message had a positive effect on the social orientation of members of the disadvantaged group tells us that apologetic messages directed at the disadvantaged group may be regarded by them as manipulative ploys intended to placate them rather than a genuine expression of remorse and commitment for a future that is free of structural violence. The results of previous research suggest that this is especially likely when there is low trust in the outgroup; without trust, conciliatory messages from one's adversary do not have positive effects on willingness for reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006).

ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO REMOVE THREATS TO IDENTITY AND THE AMBIGUITY OF THE VICTIM–PERPETRATOR DISTINCTION

The findings above provided empirical and theoretical support for the needs-based model in both directly and structurally violent contexts. Yet, the implications of these findings are limited because the source of the message that satisfied the emotional needs of the ingroup was the adversarial outgroup and the distinction between the social roles of victimized–disadvantaged group vs. perpetrating–advantaged group was unambiguous. To gain a more comprehensive picture on the processes of socioemotional reconciliation that are described by the needs-based model we consider (a) whether there are alternative modes of need satisfaction located outside the conflict dyad and (b) the implications of ambiguity in the victim–perpetrator and the disadvantaged–advantaged distinction for the process of socioemotional reconciliation.

Satisfaction of Needs Outside the Victim–Perpetrator Dyad

Instead of the unilateral (e.g., revenge or dehumanization) or reciprocal (e.g., the apology–forgiveness cycle) routes we described above, needs can also be satisfied when an authoritative third party (e.g., an opinion leader or international tribunal) acts as the source of empowerment or acceptance. Such a third party may denounce the injustice suffered by victims of direct or structural violence, punish the perpetrators, or demand social change, thereby increasing the victimized groups' relative power and influence. Perpetrators' need for acceptance may be satisfied when an authoritative third party sanctions direct or structural violence as understandable in a given context (e.g., violence that is carried out in self-defense or social privileges that have a

legitimate basis). It remains for future research to determine whether such need satisfaction from a third party increases adversaries' readiness for reconciliation to the same degree or in the same manner as the reciprocal satisfaction of needs as described by the needs-based model.

Ambiguity of the Distinction Between Social Roles

For the sake of conceptual clarity, the needs-based model assumes a clear distinction between victim and perpetrator. Yet, in many directly violent intergroup conflicts, this distinction is ambiguous, with both parties viewing themselves as victims (Noor et al., 2008). Being a victim has psychological gains. It absolves actors from the need to examine their own responsibility for violence and grants them the legitimacy to be preoccupied with their own wounds and with their adversary's guilt for having caused them. Leaving the relative safety of victimhood by admitting responsibility for past wrongdoing is hazardous (Tavuchis, 1991). The party that decides to "go first" (e.g., by apologizing to the other group) risks an indelible stain of guilt and a correspondingly permanent debt to the adversary. This wariness about going first may be reduced if actors know in advance that their admission of responsibility will be met with a willingness to understand and forgive. This knowledge will shield the repentant party from sole culpability and moral ostracism. In contexts of structural violence, the advantaged group may be similarly concerned about the consequences of admitting to the existence of discrimination and prejudice. Although in contexts of structural violence there is usually consensus as to which party is the advantaged and which the disadvantaged, members of the advantaged group may nevertheless avoid acknowledging inequality because they fear that the disadvantaged group will use this admission to pursue demands they oppose or dislike.

How can these difficulties be dealt with? In explicitly violent conflicts, the trap of double victimhood can be bypassed when both parties are encouraged to view themselves simultaneously as victims and perpetrators of past transgressions. In this case the admission of wrongdoing by one party needs to be reciprocated by a similar admission by the other. This cannot occur when there is a clear consensus as to which side perpetrated the wrongdoing (e.g., the Holocaust, the Apartheid regime). In such cases, issues of responsibility, guilt, and justice are commonly addressed by institutional mechanisms such as war tribunals or truth commissions. In a similar manner, in contexts of structural violence, greater clarity about the reactions of the disadvantaged group to an admission of responsibility by the advantaged group may allay the advantaged group's fears and promote socioemotional reconciliation. Finally, it should be reemphasized that unless such admissions of responsibility are accompanied by concrete acts to promote equality, they may be interpreted

as ploys to maintain the status quo and consequently increase rather than decrease intergroup tension.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter has differentiated instrumental reconciliation and socioemotional reconciliation as two distinct yet interdependent processes that promote positive intergroup relations and has examined the operation and implications of these processes in contexts of both direct and structural violence. It should be emphasized that structural and direct intergroup violence should not be viewed as mutually exclusive phenomena (Galtung, 1996). First, many structurally violent conflicts are born of a history of direct violence (e.g., slavery forerunning a history of racial inequality in the United States). Thus, groups become subservient to other groups because they have been subdued by force into a lower social position. Second, the structural violence of routine and continuous discrimination is often dotted with episodes of direct and intentional violence, such as police brutality. This means that a given intergroup conflict can be experienced as both structurally and directly violent, depending on the situation and even on its psychological construal, which explains why—at least to some extent—common processes, dynamics, and variables seem to operate in both contexts.

One particular aspect that both types of contexts have in common is that in both of them the reduction of negative intergroup phenomena (i.e., the cessation of direct or structural violence) is not equivalent to the promotion of positive intergroup phenomena (i.e., the restoration of trustworthy relations between and positive identities of the involved groups). Our chapter's concern with the positive phenomenon of intergroup reconciliation follows a broader shift in the study of intergroup relations, from conflict prevention to promoting harmonious relations between adversarial groups.

Although some of our review addressed processes of instrumental reconciliation, its main focus was on the needs-based model, which has been developed to examine processes of socioemotional reconciliation. The model was originally formulated to explain the emotional needs of groups involved in conflicts of direct violence, but the present chapter suggested that it can also be applied to conflicts of structural violence. We have underscored the need for an active removal of identity threats that are experienced by victimized-disadvantaged and perpetrator-advantaged groups in a way that is consistent with the principles of the needs-based model of reconciliation. We hope this chapter has contributed to this volume's endeavor to theoretically and empirically identify the factors that may realize the goal of fostering positive intergroup relations in different kinds of intergroup conflicts.

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