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A Social-Psychological Perspective on the Proximate Causation of Peaceful Behavior: The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation

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A main message of the present volume, arising from Verbeek and Peters' introductory chapter as well as from Parts Three and Four about the function and evolution of peace systems, is that both human and nonhuman societies need mechanisms that enable conflicting parties to reconcile and thus maintain valuable relationships and prevent (at least some of) the negative consequences of conflict, aggression, and lack of cooperation. Among humans, a primary social mechanism that facilitates reconciliation following transgressions is the *apology forgiveness cycle*, in which the perpetrator takes responsibility and expresses remorse for the harm caused to the victim, who, in turn, reciprocates by granting forgiveness to the perpetrator despite the wrongdoing (Tavuchis 1991). Tavuchis' (1991) seminal work on the sociology of this cycle suggests that it has the power to dramatically, almost "magically," transform the relations between former adversaries and replace the downward spiral of alienation and aggression with an upward spiral of goodwill and generosity. The Needs-Based Model of reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel 2008; Shnabel & Nadler 2008), the theoretical framework presented in this chapter, was developed in an attempt to understand, from a social-psychological perspective, how this "magic" works.

Anchored in the theoretical tradition of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1986), the main tenet of the Needs-Based Model is that transgressions, at both the interpersonal and intergroup levels, threaten specific dimensions in the identities of victims and perpetrators. As long as these threats are not removed, they serve as barriers to reconciliation and might even lead to the conflict's escalation. However, restoring victims' and perpetrators' positive identities, which can be done through the apology forgiveness cycle, should serve as a catalyst for reconciliation, increasing victims' and perpetrators' readiness to show goodwill toward each other. As this brief description implies, in terms of the four principal questions that guide ethological research (Tinbergen 1963), the Needs-Based Model concerns the immediate causation of conciliatory behavior. That is, it aims to identify factors within the organism (e.g., the motivation to restore positive identity) and outside of it (e.g., one's social role, of victim or perpetrator, within a given social context) that facilitate or hinder conciliatory behavior.

I open the present chapter by defining reconciliation and distinguishing it from the related concepts of conflict settlement and resolution. I then introduce the theoretical

perspective of the Needs-Based Model of reconciliation and present empirical findings that support its hypotheses regarding the dynamics between victims and perpetrators in contexts of both interpersonal and intergroup transgressions. I then move on to extend the model to "dual conflicts" in which there are no consensual, clear-cut roles of victims and perpetrators because both adversaries transgress against each other. I conclude by summarizing the theoretical insights provided by the model to the scientific understanding of peaceful behavior. I also point to the practical implications of the model for the planning of interventions intended to promote such behavior among conflicting individuals and groups.

Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution

The concept of reconciliation was introduced into the scientific discourse by primatologists de Waal and van Roosmalen (1979) in their reports of friendly reunions between former chimpanzee opponents soon after aggressive confrontations. However, it took almost two more decades before mainstream social psychology began to devote greater attention to the study of reconciliation (Nadler 2012). Thus, ironically, research on how nonhuman animals reconcile and make up following conflicts was ahead of the corresponding research on humans (de Waal 2000).

One reason for this relatively late introduction of the concept and study of reconciliation into mainstream social psychology may be that during the second half of the twentieth century, the study of conflict in the social sciences (including social psychology) was dominated by a realist approach to conflict and its resolution. According to this view, "disputes between persons and between groups are grounded in conflicts of material interests" (Scheff 1994, p. 3). These interests may range from natural resources such as land or water in contexts of international conflicts to pocket knives in contexts of competing groups of children within a summer camp setting (Sherif *et al.* 1961). The realist viewpoint has generated much interest and insight over past decades, for example through the introduction of concepts and theorizing based on game theory into social psychology (Jones 1998). However, it also encouraged a somewhat limited view of conflict settlement as reaching an agreed-upon formula (e.g., a contract or peace treaty) for distributing these contested resources, be it land or pocket knives, between the adversarial parties (see Kelman 2008). As such, the realist approach may have contributed to drawing attention away from the emotional, non-instrumental processes involved in conflicts and their resolution. Yet, such non-instrumental, socio-emotional processes have critical influence, even when the ultimate goal is of instrumental nature (e.g., maintaining ceasefire at an agreed-upon border; see Furnari, this volume, Chapter 8). These socio-emotional processes are exactly the core of reconciliation.

While reconciliation is broadly viewed as the process of "removing conflict-related emotional barriers that block the way to healing a discordant relationship" (Shnabel *et al.* 2008, p. 162), its exact definition remains somewhat elusive and controversial. Kelman (2008) has proposed a distinction between reconciliation on one hand, and conflict settlement and resolution on the other hand. Conflict settlement consists of finding the formula for the division of contested resources between the adversarial parties, in line with the realist approach discussed here. Conflict resolution involves

building a pragmatic, trustful partnership wherein both sides view cooperation as best serving their interests (i.e., establishing constructive "working relations"; Rouhana 2004). Finally, Kelman views reconciliation as a process of identity change in which each party strengthens the core elements of its own identity while accommodating the other. This process involves the removal of the negation of the other as an element of one's own identity and the ability to acknowledge the other's account of the conflict without having to agree with it fully. To illustrate, in the reconciliation process, each party learns to stop blaming the other party for being the sole party responsible for the conflict.

The view of reconciliation as a process of identity change, involving accepting rather than negating the adversary's identity, is also reflected in the definition of reconciliation by Staub *et al.* (2005) as "a process that must include a changed psychological orientation toward the other" (p. 301), which eventually leads to mutual acceptance. The King Center, an institution dedicated to the advancement of the legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, further emphasizes mutual acceptance as a core element of reconciliation by defining it as the "bringing together of adversaries in a spirit of community after a conflict has been resolved" (King Center n.d.). Other definitions, however, emphasize the restoration of trustworthy relations as the essence of reconciliation. For example, Exline and Baumeister (2000) define reconciliation as "a willingness to come together to work, play, or live in an atmosphere of trust" (p. 136).

The lack of a widely accepted definition of reconciliation may stem from the novelty of this concept within the conflict resolution literature and political discourse (Nadler 2012), as well as from the fact that it is an abstract concept that can denote both a process and an outcome (i.e., a state or condition), and might be hard to distinguish from related concepts such as peacemaking (Verbeek 2008). Another source of this lack of clarity regarding the concept of reconciliation may be that it is overloaded with multiple meanings. In particular, Rouhana (2004) argues that in contexts characterized by structural violence (i.e., relatively permanent unequal social arrangements that privilege some groups at the expense of others; Galtung 1969), reconciliation should mean the promotion of *positive peace*, that is, reaching a just, equal social arrangement (see Christie *et al.* [2008] for the distinction between positive and negative peace, the latter denoting the mere cessation of violence). Reconciliation in the sense of promoting mutually positive emotional orientations among conflicting groups, yet without the promotion of an equal, just social arrangement, is fake and superficial, because it serves the continuation of the oppression of the underprivileged group.

While the importance of reaching structural equality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups to the reconciliation process is beyond doubt, equating the two concepts may be viewed as a conceptual stretching of the latter (see Meierhenrich 2008). Therefore, in the present chapter, I refer to reconciliation as the process of mending and "healing" broken relationships (see also Staub *et al.* 2005). I have two reasons for conceptualizing reconciliation in this way. First, the view of reconciliation as a *relationship-oriented process* is a thread common to the various definitions of this concept. Second, according to Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto 1999), structural violence (i.e., group-based inequality) is restricted to societies that produce sustainable economic surplus (e.g., there is generally no structural violence among hunter-gatherer societies, which lack sufficient economic surplus; see also Narvaez, this volume, Chapter 6). For this reason, including the promotion of an equal, just social arrangement in the definition of reconciliation reduces the parsimony of this concept,

as it makes it applicable to a narrower range of contexts. For the purposes of the present volume, which focuses on the evolution of peaceful behavior and systems at both the individual and intergroup levels and within various human and nonhuman societies, it is important to use a parsimonious definition of reconciliation, which captures its core essence – the restoration of trust between and positive identities of former adversaries (see also Verbeek [2008] for the distinction between restorative peace, which involves the restoration of harmony to relations following conflict, and sociative peace, which involves the negation of structural violence through social justice).

The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation

As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, the apology forgiveness cycle is a major social mechanism for facilitating reconciliation, namely, for restoring victims' and perpetrators' positive identities and mutual trust. According to Tavuchis (1991), the language people use when referring to the apology forgiveness cycle (e.g., expressions such as "owing" or "accepting" an apology) implies that "something almost tangible is being bartered" (p. 33). This observation led us to conceptualize reconciliation as an *act of social exchange* in which the conflicting parties exchange symbolic, psychological "commodities"; these symbolic commodities restore victims' and perpetrators' positive identities (Shnabel & Nadler 2008) and mutual trust (Shnabel *et al.* 2014).

To understand the nature of the psychological "commodities" that victims and perpetrators exchange, we turned to theorizing about the "Big Two" (Abele *et al.* 2008), according to which there are two fundamental content dimensions along which people perceive and judge themselves and others: the *agency* dimension, representing traits such as "strong," "competent," "influential," and "self-determined"; and the *moral-social* dimension (aka the communion dimension), representing traits such as "moral," "warm," and "trustworthy."

Based on this theorizing, the Needs-Based Model argues that transgressions cause asymmetric threats to victims' and perpetrators' identities (SimanTov-Nachlieli *et al.* 2013). Victims who feel inferior regarding their power (Foster & Rusbult 1999), honor (Scheff 1994), and perceived control (Baumeister *et al.* 1994) experience threat to the agency dimension of their identity. The lack of agency makes them particularly vulnerable in light of the possibility that the perpetrator would repeat the transgression, for which victims are especially vigilant (McCullough *et al.* 2013). In contrast, perpetrators suffer from moral inferiority (Exline & Baumeister 2000). Because rejection is the social sanction imposed upon those who violate the norms or moral standards of their community (Tavuchis 1991), perpetrators are said to experience anxiety over social exclusion, which is sometimes reflected in feelings such as guilt (Baumeister *et al.* 1994), shame (Exline & Baumeister 2000), or repentance (North 1998). In addition, perpetrators may be concerned about the victim's possible intention to take revenge or avoid them, two common responses among victims, who wish to deter the perpetrator and reduce the probability of future harm to the self (see McCullough *et al.* 2013 for a discussion of acceptance, revenge, avoidance, and forgiveness as four possible responses by victims following transgressions).

The experience of these different identity threats brings about different motivational states among victims and perpetrators. Victims, who feel weak and humiliated,

experience the need to restore their sense of agency (i.e., ability to determine their own and others' outcomes). For this reason, victims often show heightened power-seeking behavior (Foster & Rusbult 1999). Victims' attempt to (re)gain power may also lead to heightened aggressive, vengeful behavior (Frijda 1994). In contrast, perpetrators, who feel that their moral image is impaired, experience the need to restore their positive moral identity and regain acceptance in the community from which they feel potentially excluded (for the fundamental need to belong and feel included, see Otten *et al.*, this volume, Chapter 3). Sometimes, perpetrators cope with their culpability through moral disengagement (e.g., minimizing the severity of the harm or blaming the victim for bringing it upon herself; Bandura 1990). Yet perpetrators' need to gain moral-social acceptance may also lead them to seek forgiveness and show heightened helping behavior toward others, including their victims (Shnabel *et al.* 2008).

The Needs-Based Model further posits that as long as victims' and perpetrators' needs remain unsatisfied, they serve as barriers to reconciliation. However, an exchange interaction through which victims and perpetrators satisfy each other's needs for *empowerment* and *acceptance* (respectively) should increase their willingness to reconcile with each other. One practice through which perpetrators can empower the victims is by apologizing to them. Perpetrators' acknowledgment of responsibility for causing the victims injustice constitutes an admission of owing them a moral debt, which only the victim can cancel (Minow 1998). This returns control to the hands of the victim. Other strategies through which perpetrators can empower their victims include pointing out the victims' achievements and capabilities (because a sense of high competence is a critical component of empowerment; e.g., Brookings & Bolton 2000), or, in the case of a victimized group, by appealing to national pride or expressing respect for the group's culture and values. This array of strategies can empower victims and restore their impaired sense of agency.

A key strategy through which victims may restore perpetrators' moral image includes expressing forgiveness, understanding for the circumstances that compelled the perpetrators' actions, and sympathy for their emotional distress. Enright *et al.* (1998) view these expressions of empathy toward the perpetrator as "gifts" that victims can offer to those who have wronged them. Such "gifts" mitigate the moral inferiority engendered by the perpetrator role (Exline & Baumeister 2000) and provide reassurance that they belong to, rather than remain excluded from, their designated moral community. Victims can also satisfy perpetrators' need for social acceptance by expressing willingness to form friendships with them or engage in economic or cultural cooperation. For example, the willingness of many Israeli Jews to buy German-made products may be interpreted as an expression of social acceptance following an era in which most Israeli Jews boycotted German-made products (Shnabel *et al.* 2008).

A successful social exchange of the symbolic "commodities" of empowerment and acceptance can promote victims' and perpetrators' willingness to reconcile with each other through two routes (Shnabel *et al.* 2014). First, such an exchange can symbolically erase the roles of "powerless victim" and "morally inferior perpetrator"; that is, it can restore the conflicting parties' positive identities and place them on an equal footing (North 1998). In addition, an empowering message conveyed by perpetrators (e.g., expressions of apology and respect toward the victims) may imply an assurance that the transgression would not reoccur and even a promise for reparation (Blatz *et al.* 2009). Similarly, an accepting message conveyed by the victims (e.g., expressions of forgiveness




Figure 2.1 The Needs-Based Model of reconciliation.

and empathy) toward the perpetrators implies that they do not intend to hold a grudge against them (Shnabel *et al.* 2014). Due to these implications, empowering and accepting messages conveyed by perpetrators to victims and vice versa can restore their trust in each other's good intentions and, thus, further increase the conflicting parties' readiness to reconcile. Figure 2.1 summarizes the process proposed by the Needs-Based Model.

Empirical Evidence in Support of the Needs-Based Model

A series of experiments by Shnabel and Nadler (2008) provide direct empirical support for the model's hypotheses in contexts of interpersonal transgressions. The first study used the "creativity-test" experimental paradigm in which participants were randomly assigned to be either "writers," who composed marketing slogans for a list of products, or "judges," who evaluated these slogans. There were two types of writer-judge dyads: control dyads and experimental dyads. In both types of dyads, writers had allegedly

failed their "test," whereas judges had allegedly passed it. However, the instructions provided to participants were different in the experimental and control dyads. In the experimental dyads, judges were instructed to be strict in their evaluations. They were also told that being too nice could harm their own chances of passing the test. By the end of the session, participants (i.e., judges and writers) in the experimental dyads were told that the judges passed the test, whereas writers failed it due to the harsh evaluations they received from their judges. In the control dyads, judges were instructed to be relatively lenient. Participants were later informed that the judges passed the test, whereas writers failed it due to the decision of an external committee. Thus, in both the experimental and control dyads, judges passed the test and writers failed it, which allowed us to control for information about success or failure. However, only in the experimental dyads did judges deliberately fail their partners to improve their own chances of passing the test; hence, their success was gained at the expense of the writers. Self-report questionnaires that measured participants' self-perceptions and psychological needs revealed that, as predicted, writers in the experimental dyads (i.e., victims) had the lowest sense of agency and the highest need for power (i.e., compared to writers in the control dyads and to judges in either the experimental or control dyads). Correspondingly, judges in the experimental dyads (i.e., perpetrators) had the lowest moral image and the highest need for acceptance (i.e., compared to judges in the control dyads and to writers in the experimental or control dyads). The same pattern of results occurred in an experimental paradigm that used real-life transgressions by asking participants to recall a personal episode in which they had either hurt or been hurt by a significant other.

An additional set of studies supported the model's prediction that addressing victims' and perpetrators' needs should increase their willingness to reconcile with each other. The first study again used the creativity-test experimental paradigm to randomly assign participants to the role of victim or perpetrator. Following the transgression (i.e., after participants learned that the writer failed the test due to the harsh evaluations of the judge, who herself passed the test), participants received a message from their counterpart that expressed, depending on the experimental condition, empowerment (i.e., acknowledgment of their high competence), social acceptance (i.e., acknowledgment of their high social skills), or neither. As expected, victims' readiness to reconcile (measured through self-report questionnaires) was highest in the empowerment condition (compared to the acceptance or control conditions), whereas perpetrators' readiness to reconcile was highest in the acceptance condition (compared to the empowerment or control conditions). The same pattern of results occurred in two experiments that used role-playing scenarios of transgressions – one describing a supervisor's refusal of a seemingly legitimate request by an employee, and the other describing a situation in which an employee returning from maternity leave discovered that her attractive job in an organization had been taken over by a fellow worker.

The experiments conducted by Shnabel and Nadler (2008) pointed to restoration of positive identity as the mechanism responsible for the increase in victims' and perpetrators' willingness to reconcile. That is, empowering messages from the perpetrators increased victims' sense of agency, and this increase, in turn, led to heightened willingness to reconcile. Correspondingly, accepting messages from the victims improved perpetrators' moral image, and this improvement, in turn, led to heightened willingness to reconcile. Subsequent studies by Shnabel *et al.* (2014) revealed

that besides the restoration of positive identities, the exchange of empowering and accepting messages between victims and perpetrators also restored their trust in each other's positive intentions. Specifically, empowering messages from the perpetrators restored the victims' belief that the perpetrators would not repeat the transgression, and accepting messages from the victims restored the perpetrators' belief that the victims would not hold a grudge or try to take revenge. The restoration of trust, in turn, mediated victims' and perpetrators' willingness to reconcile. Thus, there are two different routes, identity restoration and trust building, through which empowering and accepting messages can promote reconciliation.

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that empowering and accepting messages from non-involved third parties successfully restored victims' and perpetrators' positive identities and thus contributed indirectly to reconciliation. However, these messages failed to restore victims' and perpetrators' mutual trust and, thus, were relatively ineffective in bringing about reconciliation, compared to identical messages whose source was the other conflict party (Shnabel *et al.* 2014). These findings, which stand in stark contrast to third parties' high effectiveness in promoting conflict settlement (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992), highlight the importance of direct communication and dialogue between victims and perpetrators for the socio-emotional process of reconciliation.

Applying the Needs-Based Model to Intergroup Contexts

Self-Categorization Theory (Turner *et al.* 1987), a prominent perspective within social psychology, argues that when a given ingroup-outgroup distinction is salient, people define themselves less in terms of their unique characteristics as individuals and more in terms of prototypical attributes of their ingroup. Therefore, feelings of victimization or guilt can be experienced "by association" (Doosje *et al.* 1998), that is, individuals can feel victimized or guilty due to historical or contemporary events in which their ingroup was involved, regardless of their own personal involvement. For example, US Americans may feel victimized when reminded of the September 11th events and as perpetrators when reminded of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even if they did not personally participate in these events.

Based on the logic of Self-Categorization Theory, we theorized that the psychological dynamics between members of victimized and perpetrating groups should correspond to the dynamics between individual victims and perpetrators (Shnabel *et al.* 2009). That is, we predicted that members of victimized and perpetrating groups should be motivated to restore their ingroup's respective sense of agency or positive moral image and show greater willingness to reconcile with the outgroup when its representatives convey empowering or accepting messages to the ingroup. To test this possibility empirically, we conducted two experiments.

The first experiment (Shnabel *et al.* 2009) focused on relations between Germans and (Israeli) Jews. We reasoned that when reminding subjects of the Holocaust, Jews would perceive themselves as victims and Germans would perceive themselves as perpetrators. To examine the Needs-Based Model's predictions regarding the psychological needs associated with these social roles, we exposed Jewish and German participants to two speeches, allegedly made by the outgroup's representative at the opening ceremony of the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. The speeches were identically phrased for Jewish

and German participants, and their main message was either acceptance or empowerment of the recipient group. The accepting message highlighted that "[w]e, the [Germans/Jews], should accept the [Jews/Germans] and remember that we are all human beings," whereas the empowering message highlighted that "[i]t is the [Germans'/Jews'] right to be strong and proud of their country and to have the power to determine their own fate." In line with predictions, Jews reported feeling less powerful than Germans and showed greater readiness to reconcile with the Germans following an empowering compared to an accepting message from a German representative. Correspondingly, Germans reported having a more negative moral image than Jews and showed greater readiness to reconcile with the Jews following an accepting compared to an empowering message from a Jewish representative.

Although the pattern of results supported the model, the different pattern of responses to messages obtained among Jews and Germans could be alternatively attributed to cultural differences between the two groups. To rule out this alternative explanation, we replicated this experiment in the context of relations between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. Because, as discussed in greater detail here, both Jews and Arabs often perceive themselves as the real victims of the Jewish-Arab conflict (Shnabel & Noor 2012), we focused on a particular historical event for which there is a consensus as to the victimization of Arabs by the Jewish side: the Kfar Kasem killings. In this event, which took place in October 1956, the Jewish-Israeli border patrol killed 43 unarmed Arab civilians for violating a curfew that had recently been imposed. Using the same experimental procedure as in the German-Jewish study, we exposed Israeli Arabs and Jews to speeches conveying messages of empowerment or acceptance. The speeches were ostensibly made by representatives of their outgroup on the 50th anniversary of the killings. Consistent with predictions, while Arabs were more willing to reconcile following a message of empowerment than of acceptance from the Jews, Jews were more willing to reconcile following a message of acceptance than of empowerment from the Arabs.

Taken together, the findings of the two studies suggest that it is the social role within a specific context, rather than preexisting cultural values, which determined Jews' preference for a particular type of message: in a context where they were placed in the social role of victims, an empowering message was found to be more effective in promoting reconciliation than an accepting message, whereas in a context in which they were placed in the social role of perpetrators, an accepting message was found to be more effective.

In addition, the same pattern of results was replicated in two experiments (Shnabel, Ulrich *et al.* 2013) that examined the Needs-Based Model in contexts of relations between groups of unequal status (i.e., structural disparity). For example, in one study, participants were BA students of a university that was presented, depending on the experimental condition, as either advantaged or disadvantaged compared to a competing university in terms of access to scarce spots in a master's program. Participants also learned that because the advantaged university favors its own students, the chances of being accepted to this MA program are lower for students who graduated from the disadvantaged, compared to the advantaged, university. Following the exposure to the information about group inequality, participants were exposed to a message from a representative of their outgroup that expressed either acceptance, through reassuring their ingroup's warmth, or empowerment, through reassuring their ingroup's competence.

Consistent with the Needs-Based Model's logic, advantaged group members showed more positive attitudes (e.g., greater readiness to share resources such as labs or libraries) toward the disadvantaged group following a warmth-reassuring message, whereas disadvantaged group members showed more positive attitudes toward the advantaged group following a competence-reassuring message. In addition, following the "right" type of message, both advantaged and disadvantaged group members revealed greater readiness to act for equality (e.g., sign a petition aiming to change the admission regulations for master's programs). Thus, even though acting for equality might come at the expense of their privileged position, advantaged group members showed generosity in response to a message that removed the threat posed to their identity as warm and moral. As for disadvantaged group members, apparently the reassurance of their high competence and capabilities restored their sense of collective efficacy, that is, their belief that their ingroup can improve its situation through unified efforts. These studies suggest that messages that restore advantaged and disadvantaged groups' positive identities and mutual trust can promote reconciliation, even in its broadest meaning of reaching a more just, equal social arrangement (i.e., the meaning proposed by Rouhana [2004], as discussed in this chapter).

Applying the Needs-Based Model to Conflict of Dual Social Roles

After gaining support for the Needs-Based Model in contexts in which the social roles of victims and perpetrators (or disadvantaged and advantaged) were consensual and clear-cut, we turned to extend the model into contexts that are marked by duality of social roles, that is, contexts in which both parties have transgressed against each other. Our predictions regarding the experience of identity threats, emotional needs, and responses to messages among *duals* (i.e., individuals or group members who serve as both victims and perpetrators at the same time) were straightforward: in line with the model's logic, we predicted that duals would experience threats to both their agency and their moral image, be motivated to restore both identity dimensions, and show increased willingness to reconcile following either empowering or accepting messages from their adversaries (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel 2014).

In terms of behavior, however, the prediction was less straightforward because the experience of victimization versus perpetration could potentially influence behavior in opposite directions (i.e., antisocially vs. prosocially, respectively). Specifically, on one hand, the experience of victimization often leads to heightened aggressive, antisocial behavior: victims were found to feel entitled to behave antisocially (Zitek *et al.* 2010), and their frustration may lead them to behave aggressively (Dollard *et al.* 1939), such as by taking revenge (Frijda 1994), in an attempt to restore their impaired sense of agency. The experience of perpetration, on the other hand, may lead to prosocial behavior. As discussed earlier, although perpetrators sometimes attempt to deny their responsibility for causing injustice (Bandura 1990; Schönbach 1990), when faced with the immorality of their acts, they may also try to restore their positive identity through reconciling and compensating their victims (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton 1998), including offering them help.

Although duals experience both victimization and perpetration simultaneously, we expected their need for agency, which should lead to heightened antisocial tendencies, to exert greater influence on their behavior than their need for morality, which should potentially lead to prosocial tendencies. This expectation was based on research in the person perception domain, which found that individuals' agency-related self-perceptions (e.g., perceived competence) had greater influence on their emotional responses than their morality-related self-perceptions (Wojciszke 2005). A similar pattern was found at the intergroup level, where the perceived desirability of ingroup attributes was primarily agency- or competence-based rather than morality-based (Phalet & Poppe 1997).

We conducted two experiments to test our "primacy of agency" hypothesis (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel 2014). The first experiment induced participants with "duality" in the lab. For this purpose, we used a modified version of the Dictator Game (Kahneman *et al.* 1986), in which one player, the "proposer," allocates valuable resources (e.g., material payoffs) between herself and the second player, who serves as the "recipient." Specifically, each participant in the experiment was asked to divide valuable extra credit points between herself and another player, knowing that the other player was asked to do the same. Participants then received bogus feedback about their own and the other player's allocations. This feedback constituted the experimental manipulation: participants assigned to the victim condition learned that the other player allocated the extra credit points unfairly, participants in the perpetrator condition learned that they allocated the extra credit points unfairly, participants in the dual condition learned that both they and the other player allocated the extra credit points unfairly, and control participants learned that neither side allocated the extra credit points unfairly.

Following the assignment to social roles, participants filled out self-report questionnaires, which measured their experience of identity threats, motivations, and responses to messages. Replicating previous findings, these measures revealed that compared to the control participants, victims felt less agentic and were motivated to gain more power, whereas perpetrators felt less moral and were motivated to restore their moral image. Also, whereas control participants responded equally positively to empowering and accepting messages from the other player, victims responded more positively to an empowering message, whereas perpetrators responded more positively to an accepting message. Most importantly, we found that, compared to control participants, duals experienced threats to both their agency and their moral image and were motivated to restore both identity dimensions. Moreover, duals responded equally positively to accepting and empowering messages from the other player.

In terms of behavior, however, duals resembled victims. Specifically, in the last phase of the experiment, participants were given the opportunity to either deny or donate credit points to the other player, indicating vengeful (antisocial) or generous (prosocial) behavior, respectively. Victims and duals (but not perpetrators) denied significantly more credit points from the other player compared to participants in the control condition. Perpetrators (but not victims and duals) donated significantly more credit points to the other player compared to participants in the control condition. These findings support our theorizing regarding the "primacy of agency" effect of duality: like victims, duals' heightened need for restoration of agency translated into greater vengeful, antisocial behavior; unlike perpetrators, duals' heightened need to restore moral image failed to translate into greater prosocial behavior.

The second experiment replicated the same pattern of results in a context of a dual conflict between groups. Participants in this experiment were Israeli Jews who were randomly assigned into three different roles – “pure” victims, “pure” perpetrators, and duals. Depending on the experimental condition, participants were asked to recall and write about two incidents in which Palestinians victimized their ingroup (e.g., the Passover massacre of 2002 in which a suicide bomber killed 30 unarmed Israeli civilians), two incidents in which their ingroup victimized Palestinians (e.g., the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in which an Israeli settler opened fire inside a mosque and killed 29 unarmed Palestinian civilians), or one victimization and one perpetration incident. Replicating previous findings, victims reported an impaired sense of agency, a wish to restore power, and heightened aggressive tendencies (e.g., increased support for using unrestricted force against any act of Palestinian terrorism), whereas perpetrators reported an impaired moral image, a wish to restore a positive moral identity, and increased helping tendencies (e.g., greater willingness to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza). As for duals, they experienced impairment for, and wished to restore, both agency and moral image. In terms of behavior, however, duals showed only heightened aggressiveness, not heightened helpfulness, toward Palestinians.

The results of these two experiments are consistent with previous theorizing that the experience of victimization is more profound psychologically than the experience of perpetration (Baumeister 1997). For example, in contexts of protracted intergroup conflicts characterized by mutual violence, both conflicting parties develop a deep sense of victimhood but not of perpetration (Noor *et al.* 2012). These two experiments also shed light on how conflict may escalate, suggesting that when conflicting individuals or groups transgress against each other, they are likely to respond with further aggression. Tragically, what is seen as a just retribution by one party is likely to be seen by the other party as unjustified aggression that needs to be further avenged, thus fueling the continued cycle of aggression (Newberg *et al.* 2000).

Agency Affirmation: Reassuring Dual Conflicting Parties' Strength

Although the “primacy of agency” effect pessimistically revealed that duals show heightened levels of aggressiveness and vengefulness, we theorized that the fact that duals did show heightened need for restoration of their moral image leaves room for optimism. Specifically, we reasoned that addressing duals' primary need for agency may allow their need for restoration of positive moral identity to come to the fore and exert its positive effect on their behavior toward their adversaries. To examine this possibility in the context of a dual intergroup conflict, we developed an “agency affirmation” intervention, in which members of groups involved in a dual conflict were exposed to a text that reassured their ingroup's strength, competence, and resiliency. We hypothesized that once group members would be reminded of their ingroup's agency, they would be more willing to relinquish some power for the sake of moral considerations and that this greater willingness, in turn, would lead to their lower vengefulness and greater helpfulness toward each other. A series of four experiments tested the effectiveness of this agency affirmation intervention among Palestinians and Israeli Jews (Shnabel *et al.* 2016 and SimanTov-Nachlieli *et al.* 2017).

In the first experiment, which focused on Israeli Jewish participants, we pitted the agency affirmation intervention against a moral threat manipulation, which was found to increase prosocial tendencies in various interpersonal and intergroup contexts (e.g., Hopkins *et al.* 2007). Participants assigned to the agency affirmation condition were exposed to a text that affirmed Israel's strength by reminding participants that Israel is a strong nation that has proved its power, self-determination, and resilience in many domains such as the economy, technical achievements, and military might. Participants assigned to the moral threat condition were exposed to a text that portrayed Israel in a way that undermined its positive moral identity. Participants assigned to the agency-affirmation-and-moral-threat condition were exposed to a text that combined both agency affirmation and moral threat, whereas control participants read no text. We found that the exposure to agency affirmation reduced Israeli Jews' aggressiveness against Palestinians while increasing their helpfulness toward them. By contrast, the exposure to a moral threat did not affect Israeli Jews' aggressive or helpful tendencies. Moreover, the positive effect of agency affirmation was mediated by participants' willingness to relinquish power for morality (e.g., their belief that Israel should give up its power superiority in order to be just and fair with the Palestinians). An additional experiment replicated these findings and further revealed that a morality affirmation intervention (i.e., the reassurance of the moral-social dimension of the Israeli Jews' ingroup's identity) failed to set in motion a process leading to greater prosocial tendencies.

The third study revealed that the positive effect of agency affirmation was replicated even under conditions of intense security threat. In particular, we tested the effectiveness of this intervention during the military operation “Pillar of Cloud,” which took place in November 2012. During this operation, the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) air force bombed more than 1500 sites in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups fired over 1500 rockets into Israel. At the sixth day of the operation, we recruited Israeli Jewish participants to take part in an online experiment in which they were randomly assigned either to a control, no-text condition or to the agency affirmation condition, which exposed them to a text based on the previous study, yet adjusted to the wartime context. For example, the text referred to the effectiveness of the Israeli Iron-Dome anti-rocket defense system, which was used during the operation for the first time and proved to be highly efficient. Compared to the control condition, participants in the agency affirmation condition showed greater readiness to relinquish power for the sake of moral considerations (measured using self-report items such as “Israel should restrain its operations in Gaza to maintain its positive moral image in the world”). This greater readiness, in turn, led to less vengefulness and more helpfulness toward Palestinians. To illustrate, compared to control participants, participants in the agency affirmation condition were less supportive of military operations that would harm Palestinian citizens and more supportive of providing them with humanitarian aid.

The fourth experiment examined the effectiveness of agency affirmation among Palestinians. We were concerned that Palestinians might be less susceptible than Israelis to an affirmation of their ingroup's agency (i.e., it might be harder to effectively affirm the Palestinians' ingroup's agency), due to their ingroup's relative inferiority in terms of military force, economic conditions, and so on. Notably, despite the substantial power asymmetry, the obtained pattern of results generally corresponded to the one obtained among Israeli Jews. In line with expectations, exposing Palestinian participants to a text

that affirmed the Palestinians' strength and resilience (i.e., reminding participants that the Palestinian nation is strong, cohesive, and known worldwide for its inner strength and resiliency) increased their willingness to relinquish power for morality (e.g., readiness to give up the use of violence in order to be just and moral in the conflict against the Jews). This, in turn, led to greater helping tendencies toward Israelis (e.g., providing Israelis with humanitarian aid in case of a natural disaster). Once again, the exposure to moral threat did not affect participants' prosocial tendencies.

In summary, a series of experiments revealed that an affirmation of their ingroup's agency increased mutual prosocial tendencies among members of groups involved in a dual conflict. Interestingly, experiments conducted by Shnabel, Halabi *et al.* (2013) imply that even an indirect affirmation of agency can carry such positive effects. Specifically, Shnabel and colleagues exposed Israeli Jews and Palestinians to a text that induced them with a "common perpetrator identity" by highlighting that both parties are equipped with lethal weapons and have actively inflicted substantial harm upon each other. The exposure to this text increased Israeli Palestinians' and Jews' sense of their ingroup's agency (e.g., their belief that their ingroup has the power and resources to solve the conflict) compared to a control, neutral-text condition. The increase in agency, in turn, translated into reduced engagement in competition over the victim status and greater forgiveness tendencies. Thus, drawing group members' attention to their ingroup's strength, even through a reminder of how this strength was misused against the outgroup, can address their pressing need for agency and allow their need for restoration of positive moral image to come to the fore. While this work focused on the group level, we are currently conducting additional research to extend our understanding of the effects of agency affirmation at the individual level.

Implications for the Science of Peaceful Systems and Behavior

In the present chapter, I have argued that conflicting individuals and groups experience threat to the two fundamental dimensions of their identity, namely, the agency and communion (i.e., moral-social) dimensions; consequently, they feel enhanced needs for empowerment and acceptance. These basic needs can manifest in various ways. For example, in the context of a conflict between competing universities, the need for empowerment or acceptance may be manifested as students' wish for reassurance of their competence or warmth, whereas in the context of a prolonged violent conflict between national groups, the need for empowerment or acceptance may manifest as the wish for military superiority or recognition of the ingroup's morality by other nations. While the Needs-Based Model focuses on the link between addressing these needs and reconciliation among humans, it may be interesting to examine whether such a link exists among nonhuman animals as well (e.g., other primates). What may be unique to humans, however, is the translation of these basic needs for empowerment and acceptance into more abstract identity-related motivations, such as the motivation to establish one's victim status in an attempt to gain support from third parties (Noor *et al.* 2012) or to protect one's moral image (Sullivan *et al.* 2012).

The empirical findings presented in this chapter suggest that addressing the identity-related motivations of conflicting parties can lead to their mutual expressions of generosity, even at the expense of giving up power and privilege for the sake of

moral, prosocial considerations. These findings are theoretically important in light of the fact that many social-psychological theories highlight individuals' and groups' motivation to maximize their outcomes (e.g., interdependence theory; see Rusbult & Van Lange 1996) and gain power and dominance (e.g., social dominance theory; Sidanius & Pratto 1999). These motivations are often associated with competitive, aggressive, and antisocial behavior. However, the research presented in this chapter reveals that conflicting individuals and groups also have strong moral-social motivations, which can be harnessed to promote mutual prosocial behavior. As such, this research may be viewed as part of the general trend within social and biological sciences of paying greater attention to humans' and other species' capacity for cooperation, empathy, and prosocial behavior. This capacity has been overlooked in earlier literature, which was predominated by the idea that "animal life, and by extension human nature, is based on unmitigated competition" and therefore "a hallmark of humanity is aggression" (de Waal 2012, p. 874).

Drawing attention toward these "better angels of our nature" is important not only for theoretical but also for practical reasons. The Needs-Based Model tells us that restoring adversarial parties' positive identities can not only prevent further conflict escalation but also set in motion an upward spiral of goodwill (see also Ali & Walters [this volume, Chapter 5] for a discussion of how peacebuilding programs may initiate such an upward spiral). The purpose of restorative justice interventions, which focus on addressing the emotional needs of adversaries rather than on merely punishing perpetrators (Wachtel & McCold 2001), is to initiate such an upward spiral. Such conciliatory interventions range from international peacemaking tribunals such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to innovations within schools, social services, communities, and the criminal justice system (e.g., in the form of structured encounters between criminals and their victims) (Boyes-Watson 2008).

Importantly, the insights gained from work on the Needs-Based Model suggest that these interventions should be planned in a way that allows victims to feel empowered and perpetrators to feel accepted. For example, in encounters between criminals and their victims, the victim should be able to determine, or at least influence, the appropriate punishment (Shnabel *et al.* 2008); in dialogue groups between former victims and perpetrators (e.g., Jews and Germans), emphasis should be put on developing mutual empathy, such that members of the perpetrating group would not feel morally condemned due to their group affiliation (Maaz & Bar-On 2002); and in the reintegration of former child soldiers, these children should make restitution to their communities (e.g., through rebuilding a school or a health post), while community members need to accept the returnees as "our children" and learn to see them not only as perpetrators but also as those who had been subjected to considerable suffering themselves (see Wessells & Kostelny, this volume, Chapter 9). I hope that the present chapter and volume will encourage future research and development of such theory-informed interventions to promote peaceful systems and behavior.

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3

Inclusion as a Pathway to Peace: The Psychological Experiences of Exclusion and Inclusion in Culturally Diverse Social Settings

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In times of globalization, international mobility, and growing emancipation of minority groups, social systems such as companies, schools, and universities are typically characterized by diversity, for example in terms of ethnicity, gender, age, religion, or sexual orientation. Yet, even though diversity has become a typical feature of modern social groups, it is a feature that may not only be experienced as enriching, but also pose a challenge to tolerance and peaceful relations among group members. Therefore, the growing complexity of modern societies has triggered an increasing interest in understanding how social exclusion can be prevented and how social systems can be built that provide safe feelings of inclusion for members of all groups involved.

Advantages of diverse as compared to homogeneous groups have been shown especially for the domain of creativity and innovation (e.g., Nijstad & Paulus 2003; van der Zee & Paulus 2008). Yet, regarding social functioning of diverse groups, outcomes are generally less positive. Research – especially in the work context – has revealed that diversity in groups may enhance the probability of conflict and communication problems (e.g., Williams & O'Reilly 1998; Joshi & Roh 2009). Rather than a larger diverse group seeing itself as an entity, it is often subdivided into subgroups, and these subgroups will typically differ in terms of status and access to relevant resources (e.g., Homan *et al.* 2007). Accordingly, group members – especially those from minority groups – may experience disadvantages and exclusion. As we will outline in more detail in this chapter, such experiences are costly as they not only are prone to negatively affect individual well-being and group functioning, but also may enhance the probability of conflict and aggression. Yet, while exclusion may pose a threat to peaceful relations within and between groups, the reliable experience of inclusion can be assumed to enhance and secure positive relations among the members of today's complex social groups.

In the present chapter, we summarize relevant theories and empirical evidence regarding the psychological experience of exclusion and inclusion in social groups, especially in groups that are diverse. The studies we report on mostly refer to *individual* experiences of inclusion and exclusion, and they measure how these experiences translate into well-being and harmonious – as opposed to conflictual – relations with others. Hence, when we refer to implications of these findings for securing or increasing

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