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Intergroup reconciliation: Instrumental and socio-emotional processes and the needs-based model

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We discuss the complexity of the concept of intergroup reconciliation, offer our definition of it, and identify instrumental and socio-emotional processes as distinct processes that facilitate reconciliation. We then present the needs-based model, according to which conflicts threaten victims' sense of agency and perpetrators' moral image, and social exchange interactions that restore victims' and perpetrators' impaired identities promote reconciliation. We review empirical evidence supporting the model and present extensions of it to (a) contexts of structural inequality, (b) "dual" conflicts, in which both parties transgress against each other, and (c) contexts in which the restoration of positive identities is external to the victim-perpetrator dyad (e.g., third-parties' interventions). Theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future research directions are discussed.

Keywords: The needs-based model; Intergroup reconciliation; Apology; Forgiveness; Competitive victimhood; Perpetrators; Victims.

In recent years there has been a growing realisation of the importance of removing psychological barriers that forestall adversaries on the way to ending conflicts. One manifestation of this realisation is the changing zeitgeist regarding the way post-conflict societies work to smooth the transition from oppression and conflict to peaceful coexistence. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), in South Africa and elsewhere (e.g., Avruch & Vejerano, 2002), and public apologies by political leaders to a formerly victimised group (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Gibney, Howard-Hassmann, Coicaud, & Steiner, 2008) are examples of contemporary efforts to disarm conflict-related emotional barriers

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and thereby facilitate improved intergroup relations. Another manifestation of this realisation is the growth of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in legal theory and practice (e.g., Boyes-Watson, 2008). As opposed to the more traditional emphases on punishing the wrongdoer (Whitman, 2003), ADR seeks to end conflict by healing ruptured relationships between adversaries through disarming each party's negative emotions toward the other (Braithwaite, 2002).

These societal changes have been reflected in the social psychological study of intergroup conflict, which has shifted from the earlier realist approach that views conflict as emanating from disagreement on the division of scarce resources (e.g., land, water; Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1967) to consider the role of the psychological barriers (e.g., lack of trust, need for revenge) that maintain and escalate intergroup conflict. Due to this theoretical shift, since the 2000s the concept of reconciliation has been increasingly popular in scholarly writings on this topic (Nadler, 2002, 2011, 2012). The research presented in the present article is part of this scientific interest in the study of reconciliation.

We begin by conceptualising reconciliation as denoting both an outcome and a process. We first offer a definition of the *outcome* of intergroup reconciliation as changes on structural, relational, and identity-related aspects of intergroup relations. Then, in the second and main section of the article, we shed light on the social-psychological *process* of intergroup reconciliation. We distinguish between instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation and then present the needs-based model, the theoretical framework that has guided our research on socio-emotional reconciliation. We conclude by discussing the theoretical implications, practical applications, limitations, and future directions of this theory and research.

INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION AS AN OUTCOME: DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

Scholars writing about reconciliation as an outcome have dealt with the elusive nature of the concept in either of two ways. One was to define reconciliation very broadly, for example, as “a changed psychological orientation toward the other” (Staub, 2006, p. 868) or “a change of motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions” (Bar-Tal, 2009, p. 365). Such overarching definitions represent what Meierhenrich (2008) calls “conceptual stretching”, because they do not distinguish reconciliation from other general concepts such as “intergroup harmony” or “peaceful relations”. The other way of dealing with this concept's complexity was by providing a specific definition that centres on the aspect seen by a particular scholar as the most cardinal feature of the outcome of reconciliation. An examination of these definitions reveals three different, but related, emphases: structural, relational, and identity-related (Nadler, 2012).

The *structural* emphasis, which is especially relevant to contexts in which the conflicting parties share a common society, views the core of reconciliation as the transformation of power relations between the advantaged and

disadvantaged groups into an equality-based social structure (Rouhana, 2004). To illustrate, scholars studying post-apartheid reconciliation processes in South Africa argue that stable reconciliation between Blacks and Whites depends on structural changes towards greater racial equality (Du Toit & Doxtader, 2010). Achieving such structural change involves macro-level legal processes, such as affirmative action programmes or nationalisation of resources. Although several scholars have considered the social psychological processes related to such macro-level structures (e.g., social identity theory, Tajfel, 1981; see also work on collective action, e.g. Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), these processes have been studied primarily in other social sciences (e.g., sociology or political science).

The *relational* emphasis views greater intergroup trust and more positive relations as key elements in a reconciled intergroup reality (Kriesberg, 2007). “People-to- people” programmes in the era following the Oslo Accords in the Middle East (Nadler & Saguy, 2004) and community building efforts in post-conflict Balkan societies (Corkalo et al., 2004) that aimed at building greater trust between former adversaries are real-world examples of this emphasis.

Finally, the *identity-related* emphasis suggests that conflicts threaten the identities of the parties involved and that these identity threats fuel the continuation of the conflict (Kelman, 2008). For example, when the in-group has been defeated and victimised, its members may feel humiliated and seek revenge in an attempt to restore their in-group’s dignity (Lindner, 2006). Also, when the in-group had committed severe violent acts against the out-group, the need to maintain its positive moral identity might cause its members to disengage from these immoral acts by denying responsibility (e.g., claiming that “the other side had brought it on itself”, Bandura, 1999). Such moral disengagement prevents the conflict from ending. The identity-related emphasis thus views reconciliation as the amelioration of conflict-related threats to adversaries’ positive identities.

Taken together, this tripartite view suggests a definition of the *outcome* of intergroup reconciliation as: “*Trustworthy positive relations* between former adversaries who enjoy *secure social identities* and interact in an *equality-based social environment*” (Nadler, 2012, p. 294). A social outcome that is characterised by changes in all three aspects is likely to represent a more stable reconciled intergroup reality than one characterised by change in only one or two. Importantly, however, the distinction between the structural, relational, and identity-related aspects of reconciliation is made for the sake of conceptual clarity, as we acknowledge that the different aspects are interdependent. To illustrate, research conducted in Northern Ireland (Tam et al., 2008) and the former Yugoslavia (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008) shows that warm relationships between individuals from adversarial groups (i.e., a relational aspect of reconciliation) are associated with readiness to forgive the perpetrator group for past wrongdoings (an identity-related aspect of reconciliation). Thus, the three

aspects of reconciliation operate together to facilitate a general positive orientation towards the Other that is solid and enduring.

Our measurements of reconciliation across the studies reviewed in this paper reflect the gradual move from a generalised to a more nuanced understanding of the outcome of reconciliation. In the early studies (i.e., Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) we measured the consequences of restored identities for a generalised shift from animosity towards more positive perceptions, feelings, and perceived future relations with the adversary. As our thinking progressed, we refined our measures in a manner consistent with the tripartite definition of the outcome of reconciliation. These later experiments thus assessed not only the role of restored identities, but also the role of trust in the Other (Shnabel, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2014) and readiness to work for greater intergroup equality (Shnabel, Ulrich, Nadler, Dovidio, & Aydin, 2013) as additional aspects of the generalised positive orientation towards the Other.

The remainder of this article focuses on social-psychological *processes* that affect the *relational* and *identity* dimensions of the outcome of reconciliation.

THE INSTRUMENTAL AND SOCIO-EMOTIONAL ROUTES TO RECONCILIATION

Our theorising (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) distinguishes between instrumental and socio-emotional routes to intergroup reconciliation: The first consists of acts of pragmatic cooperation to achieve common instrumental goals (e.g., cleaner environment, better health), whereas the second consists of removing the emotional barriers (e.g., victims' humiliation or perpetrators' shame) that prevent reconciliation. We suggest that these routes differ in terms of their temporal focus: Instrumental processes focus on recurring positive cross-group interactions in the present, whereas socio-emotional processes require coping with the pains of the past, namely dealing with issues of historical responsibility and culpability.

Another major difference between the two processes has to do with the *goal* of reconciliation. Although both instrumental and socio-emotional processes are important for intergroup reconciliation in all intergroup conflicts, the emphasis on one or the other depends on whether the desired post-conflict reality is separation or integration. When adversaries desire a future of two separate social entities, they need to build a pragmatic partnership that will allow them to coexist in a conflict-free environment. Instrumental processes are likely to be sufficient to achieve this goal. This is especially true immediately after the violent conflict has ended. During this period, socio-emotional processes of reconciliation that centre on blame, guilt, and victimhood are likely to open the wounds of the very recent conflictual past and thus hamper the parties' ability to coexist. However, when the two groups seek integration as a single social unit, the Other serves as

an immediate and constant source of threat to the in-group's positive identity, and reconciliation needs to defuse these threats through socio-emotional processes. Long and Brecke (2003) make a similar observation by noting that instrumental processes—which they call the “signalling model” of reconciliation—are important when adversaries are separate nations, whereas socio-emotional processes—which they call the “forgiveness process”—are more important in intra-societal conflicts. The fact that TRCs, which constitute a socio-emotional process of reconciliation, are more common in intra-societal conflicts provides further support for this idea (Hughes, Scabas, & Thakur, 2007).

Admittedly, instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation represent mutually interdependent rather than entirely separate processes. For example, identity restoration processes (e.g., through expressions of apology or forgiveness; see below) can also promote the process of trust building (Shnabel et al., 2014). Nevertheless, for the sake of conceptual clarity it is useful to distinguish between these two routes to reconciliation, which we discuss in greater detail below.

Instrumental processes of reconciliation change the quality of intergroup relations from relations marked by distrust and animosity to relations marked by mutual trust and cooperation. A major path to achieving such a change is recurring cooperative interactions designed to achieve a common, superordinate goal that is instrumentally important to both parties. Through this interaction the parties learn to trust each other. Sherif's (1958) seminal Robber's Cave experiment demonstrates this process. In this field experiment, two hostile groups of boys became friendlier and more cooperative after having repeatedly coordinated their efforts to achieve goals that were important for both groups and which could not be reached by either group acting alone. Consistently, a recent review (Hewstone et al., 2014) of the research conducted within the framework of Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis in various conflictual contexts, including Northern Ireland (Tam et al., 2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cehajic et al., 2008), and Cyprus (Psaltis, 2011), found that one of the key mediators of the effect of intergroup contact on reducing prejudice and promoting positive mutual behavioural tendencies was out-group trust. Peace-building programmes, which aim to build peaceful coexistence between former enemies through repeated intergroup contact focused on mutual pursuit of common goals (e.g., agriculture development), exemplify the instrumental route to reconciliation (e.g., Corkalo et al., 2004; Lederach, 1997; Nadler & Saguy, 2004).

Socio-emotional processes of reconciliation focus on removal of threats posed to the conflict parties' identities due to their involvement in the conflict. Social-psychological research on the role of emotions such as guilt, shame, hatred, humiliation, and vengeance in maintaining and escalating conflict (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Gross, Halperin, & Porat, 2013; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004), and on the positive effects of defusing these feelings on ending conflicts (Lindner, 2006), indicates that threats to group

members' sense of adequate identity can block or, if removed, facilitate reconciliation. Real-world examples of identity restoration are the apologies made by leaders of perpetrator groups to victim groups. Admittedly, existing empirical evidence points to the relative ineffectiveness of public apologies in promoting intergroup forgiveness (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). Yet many scholars argue that under appropriate conditions (e.g., acceptance of guilt, setting historical records straight, and discussing reparations; Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011), apologies may constitute honest acknowledgement of the perpetrators' debt to the victims. This acknowledgement validates and gives voice to the victims' painful experience (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003), rehabilitates their previously powerless identity (Branscombe & Cronin, 2010; Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008), and potentially results in greater willingness to forgive and reconcile (Minow, 1998).

In the next section we present the theoretical framework that has guided our research on socio-emotional processes of reconciliation: namely, the needs-based model. While the model has been examined in various contexts of interpersonal conflicts, the present article focuses on the intergroup domain. The remainder of this article is thus devoted to the review of research on intergroup reconciliation conducted within and extending the needs-based model's framework.

THE NEEDS-BASED MODEL OF RECONCILIATION

The needs-based model is grounded in the premise of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), according to which group members are generally motivated to maintain their positive social identity and strive to restore it to the extent that it is threatened. Applying this reasoning to contexts of intergroup transgressions, the model's novel assertion is that the threats posed to victims' and perpetrators' identities are of an asymmetrical nature. Victims experience threat to their sense of power (Foster & Rusbult, 1999), honour (Scheff, 1994), and control (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995), whereas perpetrators experience threat to their identity as morally adequate social actors (Exline & Baumeister, 2000).

Our conceptualisation of the differential threats posed to victims' and perpetrators' identities is consistent with theorising about the Big Two in social judgment and behaviour (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013; see also Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008). According to this theorising, there are two fundamental content dimensions along which social targets (such as groups) perceive and judge themselves and others: the *agency* dimension, representing traits such as "strong", "competent", "influential", and "self-determined"; and the *moral-social* (or communion) dimension, representing traits such as "moral", "warm", and "trustworthy" (for similar reasoning see also the stereotype content model; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Thus, in terms of the Big Two theorising, victims may be said to experience threat to the agency dimension of their identity whereas perpetrators experience threat to the moral-social dimension (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Nadler, 2013).

The Big Two identity dimensions represent broad content categories, which include distinct components. For example, the agency dimension includes components such as competence on the one hand and dominance on the other, even though people perceive these two traits as clearly distinct (Rudman & Glick, 2001). Status and power also fall under the same overarching category of agency, even though they have been shown to have different effects on people's behaviour (Blader & Chen, 2012). Similarly, the moral-social dimension includes components such as warmth and sociability on the one hand and morality on the other, even though they have been shown to constitute different aspects of group members' identities (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Nevertheless, theorising on the Big Two argues that these different contents can be subsumed under two overarching categories (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2013). Based on this argument, we suggest that in general, victims and perpetrators can be said to suffer from impairments to their agency and moral-social dimensions, respectively, yet the *specific* threat experienced depends on the particular transgression context. Thus, in certain contexts (e.g., intergroup inequality) members of the victim group may be primarily concerned with their stereotypical portrayal as incompetent (see Fiske et al., 2002), whereas in others (e.g., open war) they may be primarily concerned with their impaired sense of power (Shnabel et al., 2009). Similarly, in certain contexts, members of the perpetrator group may be primarily concerned about the threat posed to their image as warm and likeable, whereas in other contexts they may be primarily concerned with their impaired image as just and moral.

The needs-based model further argues that the experience of threat results in corresponding motivational states. Using Bakan's (1966) terminology, victims wish to satisfy their basic need for agency (i.e., efficacy and control over outcomes; Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 2011), whereas perpetrators wish to satisfy their basic need for communion (i.e., being accepted and liked by others). Consequently, victims show heightened power-seeking behaviour (Foster & Rusbult, 1999) and often wish to get even with their perpetrators (Frijda, 1994) as a means to reassert their identity as agentic social actors. Perpetrators, by contrast, experience "anxiety over social exclusion" (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994, p. 246), because the sanction imposed upon those who violate moral standards is social rejection (Tavuchis, 1991). Consequently, perpetrators are motivated to restore their positive moral image and reassure their identity as morally accepted social actors. While in principle this motivation could be predicted to encourage apology and efforts to undo the harm, perpetrators often try to avoid unpleasant emotions such as collective guilt (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006) and instead turn to restore their moral identity through strategies of moral disengagement—minimising their responsibility for the harm-doing, belittling its consequences for the victims, or dehumanising them (Bandura, 1999).

Disturbingly, the behaviours stemming from victims' and perpetrators' efforts to restore their positive identities are likely to further intensify conflict: Revenge results in cycles of increased violence (Newberg, d'Aquili, Newberg, & deMarici, 2000), and moral disengagement sets the stage for recurring victimisation (Bandura, 1999).

Optimistically, however, the needs-based model posits that an interactive process of social exchange through which the perpetrator group empowers the victim group, and the latter accepts the former, can serve as an alternative means through which both victims and perpetrators may restore their identities. The apology–forgiveness cycle is a paradigmatic example of such an interactive process. The act of apology serves as recognition of the “debt” that the perpetrator owes the victim such that only the victim can determine whether this “debt” will be absolved. Commenting on this dynamic, Tavuchis (1991) writes that “once the symbolic overture has been made, the victim alone holds the keys of redemption and reconciliation” (p. 35), and Minow (1998) writes that “forgiveness is a power held by the victimised” (1998, p. 17). Thus, when perpetrators apologise for past wrongdoings they put their fate in the hands of their former powerless victims, who are empowered by virtue of being the only ones who can grant forgiveness. Correspondingly, an expression of forgiveness by the victim removes the threat to the perpetrator’s moral identity and signals to them that they are now accepted in the moral community from which they were potentially excluded. Echoing this idea, North (1998) writes that after forgiveness has been granted, victims and perpetrators “. . . are equal in terms of respect, esteem and consideration due them . . .” (p. 34), and Exline and Baumaister (2000) write that “expressions of forgiveness and repentance could symbolically erase the roles of victim and perpetrator, placing the involved parties on a more equal footing” (p. 138). [Figure 1](#) summarises the process proposed by the needs-based model.

The next sections first review the empirical findings that support the needs-based model’s hypotheses that (a) victims and perpetrators experience differential identity threats and are consequently motivated to restore their agency and moral image, and (b) empowering and accepting messages from the out-group can remove the threats to victims’ and perpetrators’ identities and increase their readiness for reconciliation. Next, three extensions of the model are presented. The first examines the model’s applicability to conflicts characterised by structural inequality, rather than direct violence; the second examines the model’s applicability to dual conflicts, in which both parties transgress against each other and engage in competition over the victim status; finally, the third extension examines whether restoring victim and perpetrator group members’ identities by efforts external to the victim–perpetrator dyad (e.g., through interventions by third parties) can also facilitate reconciliation.




Figure 1. The needs-based model of reconciliation.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE NEEDS-BASED MODEL'S BASIC HYPOTHESES

The first empirical test of the needs-based model used a series of studies that focused on contexts of interpersonal transgressions (see Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Then, the next step in our research programme was to test the model's basic hypotheses in contexts of intergroup transgressions. According to self-categorisation theory, when their in-group affiliation becomes salient, group members define themselves in terms of the prototypical attributes of their in-group rather than their unique personal attributes (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Blackwell, 1987). Under these conditions, group members can feel guilty (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) or victimised (Volkan, 2001) due to historical events in which their group has been involved. For example, Germans may feel like perpetrators when reminded of the Holocaust and like

victims when reminded of the Dresden bombing, even if they were born years after these historical events. Based on this theorising, we hypothesised that the dynamics between victims and perpetrators at the intergroup level—in terms of experienced identity threats, and consequent needs and responses to conciliatory messages—would be similar to those found at the interpersonal level (i.e., in Shnabel & Nadler's, 2008, set of studies).

To test our hypotheses, we conducted two experiments that tested the model's predictions by reminding participants of historical events in which their in-group either victimised or was victimised by another group (Shnabel et al., 2009). Participants in the first experiment were 62 Jewish and 60 Arab citizens of Israel who were recruited by e-mail through snowballing sampling to complete a web-based questionnaire. They were told that they would participate in a study that compared responses to the same news story reported in text, audio, or video and that they were randomly assigned to the "text" condition. Participants subsequently read about the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, in which 43 unarmed Arab civilians were killed by an Israeli border patrol for violating curfew regulations they were not aware of. Hence, in this historical context, Arab participants identified with the role of victims, whereas Jewish participants identified with the role of perpetrators. In line with predictions, Arab participants reported that the massacre impaired their in-group's sense of power more than Jewish participants, whereas Jewish participants reported that the massacre impaired their in-group's moral image more than Arab participants.

Next, participants were exposed to two speeches ostensibly made by an out-group representative on the massacre's 50th anniversary. One included a message of empowerment, which referred to the right of the participants' in-group "to determine its own fate and live in respect and hold its head up"; the other speech included a message of acceptance, which referred to the participants' in-group as "our brothers" and expressed empathy towards its distress following the massacre. Arabs' willingness to reconcile with Jews—that is, their positive emotional orientation towards Jews, their optimistic view of future intergroup relations, and their readiness to make efforts to improve the atmosphere between Arabs and Jews—was greater in response to the empowering than to the accepting message. By contrast, Jews' readiness to reconcile with Arabs was higher in response to the accepting than to the empowering message. These findings support the needs-based hypotheses that the exchange of reciprocal messages that restore victims' and perpetrators' impaired dimensions of identity should result in both parties' greater readiness to reconcile.

Despite their consistency with the model, an alternative explanation to these findings could be that they simply reflect preexisting cultural differences between the groups rather than the construal of the in-group as a victim or perpetrator. The second experiment (Shnabel et al., 2009, Study 2) was designed to rule out this possibility by testing the same hypotheses in a different intergroup context. Participants in this experiment were 56 Germans and 65 (Israeli) Jews who were

recruited through snowball sampling. The design and procedures were similar to those of Study 1. Participants first learned about a public conference that focused on “past and present German–Jewish relations” in light of the Second World War. Consistent with the first experiment, Jews, who were the victims in this context, reported having a lower sense of power than Germans; correspondingly, Germans, the perpetrators, reported a lower moral image than Jews.

Next, participants were exposed to two speeches ostensibly made by out-group representatives in this conference. The acceptance speech included statements like “we should accept [the in-group] and remember that we are all human beings . . . the [in-group] had suffered great pain under the Nazi-regime”. The empowerment message included statements like “we should cherish the [in-group’s] contribution to Western culture and humanity . . . it is the [in-group’s] right to be strong, proud and determine their own fate”. Consistent with the findings of the first experiment, Jews’ readiness to reconcile with Germans was greater following a message of empowerment than a message of acceptance, whereas Germans’ willingness to reconcile with Jews was greater following a message of acceptance than a message of empowerment.

Comparing the responses of Jewish participants across *both* experiments allowed us to rule out the possibility that group members’ responses to the different types of messages stemmed from preexisting cultural preferences. Specifically, Jewish participants did not show a constant preference for a specific type of message. Rather, their preference for a particular message type was determined by their in-group’s role within the given context: In a context in which their in-group served as perpetrators, Jewish participants responded more positively to an accepting compared to an empowering message from their out-group, whereas in a context of victimhood, they responded more positively to an empowering compared to an accepting message. Figure 2 illustrates the results of the two studies.




Figure 2. Willingness to reconcile as a function of the in-group’s social role and type of message from the out-group. Reprinted from Shnabel et al. (2009). © 2009 Sage Publications. Reproduced by permission of Sage Publications. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.

EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL TO CONTEXTS OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY, DUAL CONFLICTS, AND IDENTITY-RESTORATION OUTSIDE THE VICTIM- PERPETRATOR DYAD

We now turn to review three lines of research that extended the model's original formulation.

Applying the needs-based model to conflicts characterised by structural inequality

In his seminal analysis of peace-making, Galtung distinguishes between conflicts that involve "direct violence" and those that involve "structural violence" (Galtung, 1969). Paradigmatic examples of direct violence are wars where parties kill, maim, and destroy property, whereas structural violence (i.e., group inequality) characterises relations of discrimination and unequal distribution of concrete and symbolic resources between advantaged and disadvantaged groups (e.g., racial relations in the United States). Whereas in its original formulation our model focused on conflicts of direct violence (e.g., the Holocaust; Shnabel et al., 2009), we later applied it to contexts characterised by structural inequality (Nadler & Shnabel, 2011).

The model's logic suggests that like victimised groups, disadvantaged groups, often stereotypically viewed as incompetent (Fiske et al., 2002), would experience a threat to their identity as agentic and desire more power to restore it. Advantaged groups, who are often stereotypically viewed as cold and untrustworthy (Fiske et al., 2002), would experience a threat to their identity as moral and just and will seek to restore it by securing others' acceptance. Consistent with this possibility are the findings that in interracial interactions with White Americans, African Americans and Latin Americans are primarily concerned with challenging their stereotypical portrayal as unintelligent and incompetent, whereas White Americans are primarily concerned with challenging their stereotypical portrayal as racist and bigoted (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010). Based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), however, these differential threats and consequent needs among disadvantaged and advantaged group members should be predicted to exist when inequality and discrimination are viewed as illegitimate, but not when they are widely perceived to be legitimate (e.g., relations between the genders in past centuries).

This prediction was tested in two experiments by Siem, von Oetingen, Mummendey, and Nadler (2013). The first experiment manipulated status differences and their legitimacy with minimal groups created in lab, and the second used natural groups. In Study 1, in which 133 students of a German university participated for course credit, the participants' in-group was said to be either high or low in its status on important scholastic abilities. Further, half the participants,

in the low-legitimacy condition, were under the impression that this status difference had been achieved by illegitimate means (i.e., the high-status group could use hand calculators when solving maths problems, whereas the low-status group could not), while the other half, in the high-legitimacy condition, were under the impression that it had been achieved legitimately. Study 2 used status differences between real-life groups. One hundred and sixty-nine students of clinical psychology from various German universities participated in a web-based experiment in which they compared themselves to either social workers or psychiatrists, representing lower and higher status groups, respectively. Further, half learned that because clinical psychologists and the out-group members were performing similar work, this status difference was illegitimate, whereas the other half learned that because of different specialisation requirements this difference was legitimate.

Subsequently, in both experiments, participants' needs for morality (i.e., their wish to be perceived as fair) and agency (i.e., their wish to be influential) in their future interaction with out-group members were measured. As predicted, in the legitimate status condition of both experiments there were no differences between high- and low-status group members in terms of their needs for morality and agency. By contrast, in the low legitimacy status condition, high-status group members' need for morality was higher than that of the low-status group members, whereas low-status group members' need for agency was higher than that of high-status group members. Figure 3 summarises the pattern of results obtained (Siem et al., 2013, Study 1).

The next set of studies to apply the model's logic to contexts of structural inequality examined whether an exchange of messages that restore disadvantaged




Figure 3. Advantaged and disadvantaged group members' needs for acceptance and empowerment when group inequality is presented as either legitimate or illegitimate (Siem et al., 2013, Study 1). Reprinted from Siem et al. (2013). © 2013 John Wiley and Sons Inc. Reproduced by permission of Wiley and Sons Inc. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.

and advantaged groups' impaired dimensions of identities can increase their readiness to reconcile with each other. Importantly, in line with the emphasis on the structural component of reconciliation (e.g., Rouhana, 2004), we argue that in contexts of structural inequality, willingness to reconcile means not only having more positive attitudes towards the out-group, but also showing increased support for and readiness to act towards intergroup equality. Whereas for members of disadvantaged groups such support means increased collective action to promote their in-group's cause, for members of the advantaged group it means readiness to give up their privileges.

Two experiments examined these hypotheses (Shnabel, Ulrich, et al., 2013). Study 1 used natural groups of unequal status—that is, 199 students of Israeli universities of relatively higher and lower status, who volunteered to participate in “a survey about universities' admission policy” (to make the cover story reliable, they did not receive credit or payment for participation). Study 2 used an experimental manipulation that randomly assigned participants (70 German undergraduate students who completed an “academic survey” in exchange for course credit) into groups of high or low status. Students in the disadvantaged and advantaged groups were led to believe that their university was being discriminated against or treated favourably, respectively, in a scholastically important context (access to scarce places on a Master's programme). Subsequent to this information, which established unjust discrimination of one group, participants were exposed to a message from an out-group representative, which reassured either their agency (e.g., “students in your group are highly motivated and competent”) or their moral-social dimension (e.g., “students in your group are kind and fair people”). The manipulation of agency and morality through messages of competence and warmth reassurance is consistent with the theorising that low-status groups are often stereotypically portrayed as incompetent, whereas high-status groups are often stereotypically portrayed as cold and immoral (Fiske et al., 2002).

Consistent with the needs-based model's logic, members of the disadvantaged group who received a message that reassured their competence evidenced more positive attitudes towards the advantaged group than did those who received a message that reassured their warmth. In fact, despite its positive content, the warmth-reassuring message did not differ from the control condition. Correspondingly, members of the advantaged group held more positive attitudes towards the disadvantaged group when the message reassured their warmth than when it was a competence-reassuring or neutral message. Importantly, in terms of collective action tendencies, members of the advantaged group whose warmth was reassured showed greater readiness to change the discriminatory status quo (e.g., by signing a petition to change admission regulations) than participants whose competence was reassured. Correspondingly, a message reassuring disadvantaged group members' competence increased their readiness to act to change the status quo more than did a message reassuring them of their warmth. These findings illustrate the interdependence between the different aspects of reconciliation

discussed earlier, demonstrating that identity-related changes (i.e., restoration of groups' positive identities) facilitated the prospects of structural changes (i.e., group members' increased motivation to act for intergroup equality).

In addition, the findings regarding group members' collective action tendencies are of particular interest for understanding the critical role of identity restoration processes in promoting equality (i.e., the structural component of reconciliation). With regard to members of disadvantaged groups, collective action research shows that although they tend to perceive inequality as unfair and wish to amend the situation, they often fail to act collectively to challenge the status quo because they feel a lack of collective efficacy (i.e., the belief that their in-group can resolve the injustice inflicted upon it through unified effort; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Optimistically, however, our findings suggest that the reassurance of their competence by the advantaged group restored disadvantaged group members' belief that they were competent and worthy of equal treatment, as well as capable of achieving it through collective action.

Members of advantaged groups were also more willing to make an effort to increase intergroup equality once the threat to their positive moral image had been removed by the disadvantaged group's message of reassurance of warmth and acceptance. In light of the prevailing assumption that a key element preventing social change is the privileged groups' motivation to maintain their relative advantage (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this finding is of special theoretical and applied interest. Theoretically, it is consistent with Leach et al.'s (2007; see also Iyer & Leach, 2010) argument that the traditional view within social psychological theorising fails to recognise the importance of morality in intergroup relations. This failure has led to a limited conceptualisation of social change as driven mainly by the action of disadvantaged groups, because advantaged groups are assumed to be primarily motivated to maintain the status quo from which they benefit. However, along with a growing body of evidence that advantaged group members may also exhibit "solidarity-based collective action" (Becker, 2012), our findings optimistically suggest that advantaged group members may be willing to give up power and privilege once their positive identity is restored. This finding is practically important because advantaged groups have more resources and influence, and therefore their support and cooperation is often critical to achieving change.

Applying the needs-based model to contexts of dual social roles

The original formulation of the needs-based model adopted a dichotomous view of two mutually exclusive roles in conflicts: victims and perpetrators. This view is consistent with peoples' intuitions (Gray & Wegner, 2009), and in some conflicts (such as the Holocaust) with consensual historical narratives.

Nevertheless, in many, if not most, conflicts the distinction between the two roles is blurred, and each of the parties serves as victim in certain episodes within the conflict and as perpetrator in others. This is particularly so in protracted, seemingly intractable (Bar-Tal, 2013) conflicts characterised by reciprocal cycles of violence. The present section presents research that extended our model to take account of such contexts.

An experiment conducted in Liberia, which had experienced two consecutive civil wars between 1989 and 2003, made the first step towards addressing the ambiguity of the victim–perpetrator distinction (Mazziotta, Feuchte, Gausel, & Nadler, 2014). Participants were 146 Liberians who were approached by three trained Liberian research assistants and were asked to take part in a study on war and reconciliation in Liberia. Participants were asked to write about an episode in which either their in-group had victimised people from an adversarial group or another group had victimised their own. In line with previous findings of group members' biased historical memory (Sahdra & Ross, 2007), participants indicated that they found it easier to recall episodes of in-group victimhood than in-group perpetration. Moreover, half of those asked to describe an event in which their group had perpetrated violence against an out-group also described how their group had been victimised by this out-group. None of those asked to describe an event of victimisation described how the in-group had perpetrated violence against the out-group. Also, the descriptions in the victim condition were longer and more detailed than those in the perpetrator condition. These findings are consistent with Baumeister's (1996) suggestion that the experience of victimisation is psychologically more pronounced than the experience of perpetration.

In terms of psychological needs, in line with our model's predictions, participants in the perpetrator condition reported a heightened need for acceptance by the other group and greater readiness to engage in cross-group contact than did participants in the victim condition. However, as opposed to the model's predictions, victims and perpetrators reported similar, relatively high, levels of need for power. We theorised that the reason for this absence of difference between the experimental conditions may be that while participants in the victimhood condition experienced themselves as “pure” victims, those in the perpetrator condition did not experience themselves as “pure” perpetrators. Rather they experienced themselves as “duals”—that is, as victim and perpetrators simultaneously—because even though they were instructed to write solely about incidents in which their in-group had been the perpetrator, they wrote about episodes involving both perpetration and victimisation (e.g., violence against a certain out-group in retaliation against this out-group's prior violence against the in-group). Consequently, participants assigned to the perpetrator condition probably experienced themselves in both roles at the same time.

To systematically explore this psychological experience of “duality”, we conducted two experiments in which we experimentally manipulated “pure”

victimisation, “pure” perpetration, or duality, and examined participants’ consequent needs and behaviours (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). In the first experiment, which focused on the interpersonal level, 86 undergraduates who participated in exchange for credit points worked in dyads and had to allocate valuable resources (i.e., extra credit points) between themselves and their partner. The feedback on their allocation decisions constituted the experimental manipulation: Participants in the victim role were told that their own allocation decisions had been fair whereas their partner’s allocation decisions were unfair; participants in the perpetrator role were told the opposite; participants assigned to the dual role were told that both their own and their partner’s allocations were unfair; finally, participants assigned to the control condition were told that both their own and their partner’s allocations were fair. Next, participants reported their needs for agency (e.g., wish to exert more control over the experiment’s results) and positive moral image (e.g., wish that their partner would understand that they tried to be fair) and had a chance to retaliate against or compensate their partner by denying or donating credit points to him or her.

Consistent with previous findings, compared to the control condition victims showed enhanced need for agency, which translated into greater antisocial, vengeful behaviour, whereas perpetrators showed enhanced need for positive moral image, which translated into greater prosocial behaviour. Most importantly, duals showed enhanced needs for *both* agency *and* positive moral image. In terms of behaviour, however, duals resembled victims: Like victims, their heightened need for agency translated into vengeful behaviour; unlike perpetrators, their heightened need for positive moral image failed to translate into prosocial behaviour.

Conceptually similar results were obtained in the second experiment, which focused on an intergroup context. Participants in this experiment were 96 Israeli Jews recruited by a commercial research firm for research on Israeli–Palestinian relations. In the perpetrator condition, participants were instructed to recall two events in which their in-group had harmed Palestinians and, in the victim condition, two events in which Palestinians had harmed their in-group. In the third, dual condition, participants were asked to recall one event of each kind. Participants’ responses were compared to the midpoint of the scale, which represented a neutral, “no change” control (for additional methodological details, see SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014).

Consistent with the findings of the first experiment, Israeli Jews in the victim condition reported increased need for agency as well as more antisocial behavioural tendencies against Palestinians (e.g., support for use of unrestricted force in response for any act of terrorism), whereas Israeli Jews in the perpetrator condition reported increased need to restore moral identity as well as more prosocial behavioural tendencies towards Palestinians (e.g., support for providing humanitarian aid to Gaza). Most importantly, Israeli Jews in the dual condition showed increased needs for *both* agency *and* positive moral image. Yet, the

TABLE 1

Means and standard deviations of agency and morality needs, and anti- and prosocial behavioural tendencies among Israeli Jews assigned to the victim, perpetrator, and dual conditions

Condition	In-group's role		Agency need		Moral need		Antisocial tendencies		Prosocial tendencies	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Victims	2.03	1.38	7.15	1.10	4.84	1.60	6.42	1.83	3.81	2.49
Perpetrators	4.64	1.73	5.16	1.16	6.61	1.49	5.04	1.99	6.30	1.97
Duals	3.19	1.27	6.46	1.17	5.92	1.54	6.06	1.98	5.01	2.21

$N = 79$ Israeli Jewish participants. In-group's role was measured on a 7-point scale, such that lower means indicate greater victimhood and higher means indicate greater perpetration. Reprinted from SimanTov-Nachlieli and Shnabel (2014). © 2014 Sage Publications. Reproduced by permission of Sage Publications. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.

behavioural responses of “duals” resembled those of victims rather than perpetrators, as they showed heightened antisocial behavioural tendencies against Palestinians, whereas their prosocial behavioural tendencies remained unchanged (see Table 1). These findings reveal that even though duals are motivated to restore both their agency and their moral image, the need for agency takes precedence and exerts greater influence on their behaviour.

The findings that members of groups involved in dual conflicts experience threats, and consequent heightened needs, to restore both their agency and moral image can also shed light on conflicting-groups members' tendency to engage in competitive victimhood (i.e., strive to establish that their in-group has been subjected to more injustice and suffering at the hands of the out-group; Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008). Specifically, because the victim's role is associated with innocence (Gray & Wegner, 2009) such acknowledgment may restore the in-group's positive moral image. This possibility is consistent with findings suggesting that groups strategically engage in competitive victimhood to protect their moral identity in response to accusations by out-groups (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). At the same time, acknowledgment of the in-group's victim status implies entitlement for redress, increases the in-group's cohesiveness, and can facilitate third-party support—all forms of social empowerment (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Moreover, when such acknowledgment is offered by the perpetrator group, it may serve as admission of responsibility and consequent moral debt (Minow, 1998), which further empowers the victim group. Thus, “winning” the victim status can potentially satisfy duals' heightened needs for both agency and restoration of positive moral image at the same time.

A study that used the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict supported our theorising about the dual motivations leading group members to engage in

competitive victimhood (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013; Study 2). Participants were Israeli Arab ($N = 78$) and Jewish ($N = 99$) students who were recruited through ads placed on the campus of Haifa University and received payment in exchange for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to read a text that constituted one of four experimental conditions. The text in the “common regional identity” condition highlighted the cultural commonalities between the two groups (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, for similar manipulations of a common, superordinate identity). The text in the “common victim identity” condition highlighted the fact that both groups experienced great suffering and loss due to the conflict (see Vollhardt, 2009, for a similar conceptualisation of “inclusive victim identity”). The text in the “common perpetrator identity” condition highlighted that both groups actively inflicted substantial harm upon each other. Finally, the text in the neutral, control condition was unrelated to the conflict. Our primary outcome variables were measures of group members’ engagement in competitive victimhood, as well as their willingness to forgive the out-group, previously found to be negatively predicted by competitive victimhood (Noor et al., 2008).

As expected, the common regional identity, which was found to increase mutual prosocial tendencies in contexts of intergroup conflicts *not* characterised by competitive victimhood (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), failed to reduce competitive victimhood and increase forgiveness among Arabs and Jews, as it did not address their pressing need for acknowledgement of their in-group’s victimisation. By contrast, both the common victim identity and the common perpetrator identity conditions reduced group members’ engagement in competitive victimhood and increased their readiness for mutual forgiveness, yet they did so through different routes. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 4, because belonging to a victimised group implies moral superiority (Noor et al., 2012), the common victim identity condition reduced participants’ sense of threat to their in-group’s positive moral image. Consequently, their need to protect the in-group’s moral image at any cost (i.e., moral-defensiveness) was experienced as less pressing, leading to reduced engagement in competitive victimhood and greater forgiveness. As illustrated in Figure 5, because the perpetrator role is associated with power and agency (Gray & Wegner, 2009), the common perpetrator identity condition increased group members’ sense of agency, leading, in turn, to reduced engagement in competitive victimhood and greater forgiveness. Interestingly, there were substantial differences between the groups (i.e., possibly due to the gap in terms of relative power, Palestinians showed greater impairment to their sense of agency, as well as more competitive victimhood and less forgiveness than Jews); nevertheless, there were no interactive effects, suggesting that similar processes took place in both groups. Beyond their practical implications, these findings are theoretically consistent with our theorising that group members’ engagement in competitive victimhood stems from their wish to restore their agency and moral image—which are both threatened due to the conflict.




Figure 4. Serial mediation model for the common victim identity—moral defensiveness—competitive victimhood—forgiveness path (Shnabel, Ulrich, et al., 2013, Study 2). $N = 99$ Jewish and 78 Palestinian citizens of Israel. Standardized regression coefficients (betas) are presented. For the path between common victim identity intervention and forgiveness the coefficients shown inside versus outside the parentheses represent the total and direct effects, respectively. Coefficients with one or two asterisks indicate beta weights' significance level of $p < .05$ or $p < .001$, respectively. Bootstrapping analysis (1000 re-samples) revealed a significant indirect effect, the 95% confidence interval = .002 to .166.




Figure 5. Serial mediation model for the common perpetrator identity—sense of agency—competitive victimhood—forgiveness path (Shnabel, Ulrich, et al., 2013, Study 2). $N = 99$ Jewish and 78 Palestinian citizens of Israel. Standardized regression coefficients (betas) are presented. For the path between common victim identity intervention and forgiveness the coefficients shown inside versus outside the parentheses represent the total and direct effects, respectively. Coefficients with one or two asterisks indicate beta weights' significance level of $p < .05$ or $p < .001$, respectively. Bootstrapping analysis (1,000 re-samples) revealed a significant indirect effect, the 95% confidence interval = .030 to .212.

The effects of identity restoration outside the victim—perpetrator dyad on intergroup reconciliation

As mentioned in the previous section, our original formulation of the needs-based model referred to identity restoration processes as “socio-emotional reconciliation” and used the apology—forgiveness cycle as a paradigmatic example of such processes. Consequently, our initial empirical tests of the model focused exclusively on the exchange of empowering and accepting messages within the victim—perpetrator dyad (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009; Shnabel, Ulrich, et al., 2013). The model’s formal statement, however, has gone beyond this interactive emphasis to imply that identity restoration *by itself* is sufficient to

increase conflicting parties' readiness to reconcile (see the last two rows in Figure 1). The research in this section explored whether the restoration of positive identity by itself, even when the source of such restoration is not the other conflict party, can indeed increase conflicting group members' willingness to reconcile.

The first study in this line of research (Shnabel et al., 2014) explored the potential of third parties to promote reconciliation in contexts of interpersonal transgressions. Even though it did not study intergroup relations, we discuss it because of its critical theoretical implications and because, so far, research on the needs-based model found consistent patterns across the interpersonal and intergroup levels (compare, for example, Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). Specifically, two experiments used role-playing scenarios to examine the effects of messages from either the other conflict party or a noninvolved third party, compared to a no-message control condition, on victims' and perpetrators' sense of power, moral image, trust in the positive intentions of the other conflict party, and willingness to reconcile. Participants were university students ($N = 173$ in Study 1, $N = 318$ in Study 2) who volunteered to take part in the studies in exchange for raffle participation.

We found that a message of empowerment for the victim from the perpetrator (e.g., acknowledgement of their competence and value) increased both their sense of power and their level of trust in the perpetrator's good intentions; sense of power and trust, in turn, led to victims' increased willingness to reconcile (i.e., the two indirect paths, through both sense of power and trust were significant). The same empowering message from a third party increased victims' sense of power, but not their trust; therefore, whereas the indirect effect of such message through sense of power was significant, the indirect effect through trust was not. Overall, whereas an empowering message from the perpetrator significantly increased victims' readiness to reconcile compared to the control condition, an identical message from a third party failed to do so.

For perpetrators, messages of acceptance from the victims (e.g., expressions of liking) increased both their positive moral image and their level of trust in the victim's good intentions; moral image and trust, in turn, led to perpetrators' increased readiness for reconciliation (i.e., the two indirect paths, through both moral image and trust, were significant). The same accepting message from a third party increased perpetrators' moral image, but not their trust; therefore, whereas the indirect effect of such a message through moral image was significant, the indirect effect through trust was not. Overall, and consistent with the pattern obtained among victims, whereas an accepting message from the victim significantly increased perpetrators' readiness to reconcile compared to the control condition, an identical message from a third party did not.

These findings suggest that the needs-based model in its original formulation has overlooked the fact that empowering and accepting messages from the other conflict party successfully bring about reconciliation not only because they

restore victims' and perpetrators' impaired identities, but also because they constitute trust-building gestures. That is, empowering messages for the victim from the perpetrators signal to the victims that the perpetrators would not repeat the transgression, and accepting messages from the victims signal to the perpetrators that the victims would not hold a grudge or try to take revenge. Empowering and accepting messages by third parties do not carry a similar meaning, as they do not signal the other conflict party's positive future intentions (which are the basis for trust building). These findings underscore the interdependence between relational changes, expressed in greater trust, and identity-related changes, expressed in rehabilitated identity dimensions, in achieving reconciliation.

Additional research (Harth & Shnabel, 2015) focusing on contexts of intergroup transgressions examined the potentially differential effects of neutral third parties versus third parties who share common identity with the other party to the conflict on reconciliation. One study was in the context of fraud between competing German universities ($N = 124$ university students) and the second in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To illustrate the experimental design, in Study 2, 177 Israeli Jewish participants who were recruited through snowball sampling to participate in an online study were randomly assigned to the role of either victims or perpetrators, by reading about historical incidents in which their in-group had been victimised by or had victimised Palestinians. They were then randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: a no message, control condition; a message from a UN representative—that is, a neutral third party; a message from a Jordanian representative—that is, a third party that shares common identity with the other party to the conflict; and a message from a Palestinian representative—that is, the other party to the conflict. Participants in the victim condition were exposed to an empowering message, and participants in the perpetrator condition were exposed to an accepting message from these different sources.

Consistent with our findings at the interpersonal level, messages from the other party to the conflict, but not from a neutral third party, increased victims' and perpetrators' willingness to reconcile compared to the control condition. Interestingly, messages from a third party who shared a common identity with the other party to the conflict effectively promoted reconciliation: In Study 1 they were less effective than messages from the other party to the conflict, whereas in Study 2 they were just as effective, yet in both contexts they were more effective than messages from a neutral third party. Further analyses showed that the official from the adversarial out-group was viewed as more representative of the adversarial out-group than the one from the common identity third party, who was nevertheless viewed as more representative than the official from a neutral third party. Perceived representativeness, in turn, mediated the effects of message source on reconciliation. Given that in intergroup contexts conciliatory messages

are typically conveyed via group representatives (Blatz & Philpot, 2010), this finding has important applied implications.

Furthermore, the findings that third parties who shared common identity features with the other conflict party were able to effectively promote reconciliation suggest that under certain conditions identity restoration outside the victim–perpetrator dyad can effectively facilitate reconciliation. Consistent with this possibility, research on interpersonal conflicts indicates that offenders who reaffirm their commitment to the moral values that their offence had violated show greater self-forgiveness and readiness to reconcile with the Other (Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2014). The possibility that the affirmation of a threatened identity outside the victim–perpetrator dyad can positively affect readiness for reconciliation has important implications for intergroup conflicts. Such affirmation strategies have the potential to circumvent parties’ reluctance to convey empowering or accepting messages to each other due to their concern that such positive gestures would not be reciprocated or even be used against them (Shnabel & Noor, 2012). Hence, some of our ongoing research focuses on such self-affirmation strategies. In particular, SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, Aydin and Ullrich (2015) found that the affirmation of their in-group’s agency increased dual conflicting parties’ mutual prosocial tendencies and behaviour. Moreover, Barlow and colleagues (2015) found that offering an apology to the victim group increased perpetrating group members’ positive moral image and consequent willingness to reconcile with and redress the victims.

CONTRIBUTION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The needs-based model has contributed to the trend, observed both within and outside our field, of paying greater attention to socio-emotional aspects of conflicts by introducing a novel theoretical framework for understanding reconciliation. While previous conceptual analysis generally viewed reconciliation as a process of identity change (Kelman, 2008), our model identifies the two specific identity dimensions—namely, agency and morality—which need to be changed as part of this process. The model highlights the fact that threats to these dimensions are experienced asymmetrically by victimised and perpetrating groups, and that their restoration is critical for reconciliation. Although restoration of identity dimensions by itself—that is, outside the interaction between adversaries—can have positive effects on reconciliation, an optimal process consists of direct interaction between the adversaries. Such interaction consists of an exchange in which the perpetrating group empowers the victim group, and the latter expresses moral–social acceptance of the former. The emphasis of our model on the interactional element in reconciliation and its link to identity changes is consistent with Gopin’s (2004) observation that “what goes on *between* people cannot be separated from what is going on *within* people” (p. 14). The needs-based model thus offers

integration, typically missing in social–psychological analysis (Semin, 1997) between intergroup processes on one hand and internal processes of identity change on the other.

Also, whereas previous research has typically studied the effects of transgressions on either the perpetrator group (e.g., work on collective guilt; Wohl et al., 2006) or the victim group (e.g., work on collective trauma; Volkan, 2001) separately, the needs-based model has investigated the *dynamics* between victims and perpetrators by examining their responses to messages from each other. As such, the model emphasises the reciprocal nature of reconciliation processes in the sense that both victims and perpetrators have the ability, albeit in different ways, to promote reconciliation. One implication of this emphasis concerns the onus of responsibility for reconciliation. Whereas the common view is that the perpetrators should be responsible for reconciling by redressing past wrongdoings, our model offers a more balanced approach by underscoring the fact that beyond being the morally culpable party, perpetrators are also psychologically vulnerable social actors whose basic identity-related needs must be considered and restored, together with the those of the victims, if reconciliation is to be achieved and maintained. It should be clarified, however, that this insight is not intended to undermine perpetrators' moral (and possibly legal) responsibility for their acts, but rather to identify an existing social–psychological dynamic. To illustrate, without denying the Nazis' responsibility for the Holocaust, Jews who participate in dialogue groups (i.e., structured encounters) with Germans must express (at least some) empathy for Germans' distress if they want to facilitate reconciliation (see Maoz & Bar-On, 2002).

Finally, the needs-based model has practical implications for the type of messages that adversaries can convey to each other to promote reconciliation. Intuition may suggest that in contexts of intergroup conflict, in which positive gestures by the adversary are relatively unexpected (Osgood, 1962), any positive message from the out-group can effectively open group members to reconciliation. However, the model reveals that only a positive message that meets the specific emotional needs of perpetrators and victims effectively promotes reconciliation. The model's recent extensions provide additional practical insights by identifying how processes of recategorisation (i.e., into a common victim or perpetrator group; Shnabel, Halabi & Noor., 2013), self-affirmation (e.g., of the values breached by the transgression, Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2014), and third-party interventions (i.e., by groups who share common identity features with the adversarial group; Harth & Shnabel, 2015) can facilitate socio-emotional reconciliation.

Of course, despite its theoretical and practical contribution, the research conducted within the needs-based model's framework is not without limitations. First, the experimental nature of our research, which called for exposing victims and perpetrators to the *same message* from the adversary, did not allow us to directly manipulate exposure to apologies and forgiveness because it would not

make sense to expose victims to a message of forgiveness from the perpetrators, and perpetrators—to a message of apology from the victims. We therefore used empowering and accepting messages that could be plausibly conveyed to both victims and perpetrators (e.g., acknowledgment of the group's value and heritage or morality and sociability). As a result of this experimental approach, although our theorising has used the apology–forgiveness cycle as a paradigmatic example for socio-emotional reconciliation, the assumption that apology empowers the victim, and forgiveness makes perpetrators feel accepted has not been empirically examined. This is a critical limitation of our theorising in light of the consistent findings that group apologies, especially, as is often the case, when their content focuses on the perpetrators' feelings rather than on the victims' suffering (Berndsen, Hornsey, & Wohl, 2015), are ineffective in promoting forgiveness among members of the victim group (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). In fact, group apologies might even backfire (i.e., produce feelings of anger among the victim group) under certain circumstances (e.g., when status relations are perceived as unstable, Shnabel, Halabi, & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015).

Future research is therefore needed to assess the full progression from expressions of apology and forgiveness to feelings of empowerment and acceptance, respectively, and the resultant readiness for reconciliation. For example, it is possible that due to a strong social norm that victims should forgive their perpetrators following an apology (see Harth, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2011), victims might, at least under certain circumstances, feel *disempowered* when offered an apology. Similarly, it is possible that under certain circumstances expressions of forgiveness by the victims might signal to the perpetrators that they can close the lid on the past and sweep the long-term implications of past injustices under the proverbial carpet, leading to *less* conciliatory behaviour (e.g., readiness to compensate the victims).

Another possible criticism of our research regards its use of individual-level measures (i.e., of group members' readiness to reconcile with their out-group) even though, by our very own definition, reconciliation involves macro-level, structural processes that are perhaps impervious to the opinions and actions of individual group members; a related criticism may be that individual group members' conciliatory attitudes may not necessarily translate into, or might even impede, support for equality promoting structural changes (see Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005, for similar criticisms on research conducted within the framework of the contact hypothesis). We argue, however, that it is likely that the larger the number of changed individuals, the higher the likelihood that social change in intergroup relations will occur. For example, in democratic societies a large number of pro-reconciliation individuals may translate into an election result that will put a more conciliatory government in power (see Hameiri, Porat, Bar-Tal, Bieler, & Halperin, 2014, for an individual-level intervention that increased actual dovish voting behaviour). Moreover, as the study of Shnabel, Ulrich, and colleagues (2013) reveals, the restoration of advantaged

and disadvantaged group members' positive identities (i.e., the identity-related aspect of reconciliation) increased their readiness to work for a more equal social arrangement (i.e., the structural aspect of reconciliation). Hence, even though we acknowledge the issues pointed out by Dixon and colleagues (2005), we believe they may be less troubling than there seems at first glance.

Another limitation of our work is that although participants had different backgrounds (e.g., Israelis, Palestinians, Germans, Liberians) in many of our studies they were university students, and the assessment of dependent measures relied primarily on either paper and pencil measures or relatively simple behaviours (e.g., allocation of credit points; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). Future research should aim to recruit more diverse populations and observe more complex behaviours. For example, it may examine whether and how the interventions developed in our research (e.g., the induction of a common victim or perpetrator identity) affect conflicting group members' emotional responses such as tone of voice or facial expressions (see Butler, 2011) within face-to-face dyadic interactions. Future research may also examine the model's hypotheses outside of the lab. For example, it may be interesting to explore whether restorative justice procedures (e.g., TRCs) that involve encounters between victims and perpetrators (see Boyes-Watson, 2008) are more effective to the extent that victims feel empowered, and perpetrators feel accepted following the encounter.

Another limitation of the existing research is that it has not yet tried to integrate the model's predictions with the literature on collective emotions. An important distinction in this regard is the one between shame, which emanates from perceptions of the in-group as dispositionally flawed (e.g., innately cruel or weak and inadequate), and guilt, which emanates from feeling culpability due to the group's past behaviour (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Lickel and colleagues phrased this distinction eloquently by stating that "people feel guilty for what they have done, and ashamed for who they are" (2004, p. 41). With regards to perpetrators, it is possible that the amelioration of threat to their moral image through an accepting message from their victims transforms feelings of shame into feelings of guilt, and this transformation, in turn, promotes readiness for reconciliation. This possibility is consistent with the finding that perpetrators' guilt, but not shame, predicted reparative intentions towards the victim group (Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008). As for victims, it is possible that an empowering message from their perpetrators, which places both groups on more equal footing, reduces their experience of group-based anger (Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, & Fischer, 2007), humiliation, and shame (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004) and consequently increases their conciliatory tendencies.

Another direction for future research would be to examine the type of message that group members choose to convey to their adversarial out-group. Because group members often project their own group's needs and views on the out-group

(Pearson et al., 2008), they might fail to realise that the out-group's motivations and responses are fundamentally different from their own. Hence, it is important to identify the factors that lead group members to convey the type of message that would effectively satisfy the needs of their out-group's members and facilitate reconciliation. Work by Ditlmann, Purdie-Vaughns, Dovidio, and Naft (2015), has made the first step in this direction. Specifically, Ditlmann and colleagues found that in interracial dyadic interactions, African-American participants who were highly motivated to act as agents of social change (i.e., with a high "implicit power motive"; Winter, 1991) conveyed more affiliative messages to White participants with whom they discussed the implications of slavery for contemporary American society. These affiliative messages led, in turn, to reduced anxiety and greater support for social change among the White participants. We are currently examining whether parallel effects would be obtained among members of the perpetrator group. That is, we test whether members of a perpetrator group who are high on implicit power motive intuitively understand the needs of members of the victim group and choose to convey to them empowering messages in discussions of historical injustices.

Finally, an additional direction for future research involves exploring the psychological needs of victims of social exclusion. Specifically, theorising on gross human rights violations suggests that these incidents represent the denial by perpetrators of their victims' membership in the human community; victims are therefore subjected to "moral exclusion and dehumanisation", as they are "outside of [the perpetrators'] scope of justice, barred from the protections of community membership" (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008, p. 148). If so, they may not only experience need for empowerment, as predicted by our model, but also need to be included in the moral community whose members are entitled to basic rights. Supporting this possibility, research in South Africa found that White South Africans had a stronger need for acceptance than empowerment, whereas Black South Africans experienced both needs equally. Whites were also more willing to reconcile after their need for acceptance, compared to empowerment, was addressed, whereas Blacks were equally willing to reconcile following the addressing of either need (Meyer & Ferraz, 2015). Thus, future research should consider the circumstances under which victims experience not only anger and a sense of injustice (resulting in heightened need for empowerment), but also a deep sense of rejection.

In conclusion, compared to the study of conflict resolution, the scientific study of reconciliation, both within and outside social psychology (e.g., in primatology; Silk, 2002), is relatively young. Because reconciliation in general, and intergroup reconciliation in particular is a highly complex phenomenon, which involves structural, relational, and identity-related aspects, much more research is required to fully understand the processes that inhibit or facilitate its achievement. The needs-based model, presented in the present article, has attempted to make a first step in this direction. We hope that the joint efforts of ourselves, as

well as other researchers of this topic, will build a large body of knowledge that may contribute not only to the theoretical understanding of reconciliation, but also to the development of practical interventions to promote it.

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